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GLOBALISM

JOHNSON'S MORAL CRUSADE

THE NEW REPUBLIC

JULY 3, 1965

American foreign policy has tended in this century to move back and forth between the extremes of an indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate internationalism or globalism. While these two positions are obviously identified with utterly different foreign policies — indiscriminate involvement here, indiscriminate abstention there — it is important to note that they share the same assumptions about the nature of the political world and the same negative attitudes toward foreign policy correctly understood. They are equally hostile to that middle ground of subtle distinctions, complex choices, and precarious manipulations, which is the proper sphere of foreign policy.

Both attitudes, in different ways oblivious of political reality, substitute for the complex and discriminating mode of political thought a simple approach, which in its simplicity is commensurate with the simplicity of their picture of the political world: the moral crusade. The isolationist's moralism is naturally negative, abstentionist, and domestically oriented; it seeks to protect the virtue of the United States from contamination by the power politics of evil nations. Wilsonian globalism endeavored to bring the virtue of American democracy to the rest of the world. Contemporary globalism tries to protect the virtue of the "free world" from contamination by Communism and to create a world order in which that virtue has a chance to flourish. The anti-Communist crusade has become both the moral principle of contemporary globalism and the rationale of our global foreign policy.

The anti-Communist crusade has its origins in the Truman Doctrine formulated in President Truman's message to Congress of March 12, 1947. That message assumed that the issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, from which arose the need for aid to Greece and Turkey, must be understood not as the rivalry between two great powers but as a struggle between good and evil, democracy and totalitarianism. In its positive application this principle proclaimed the defense of free, democratic nations everywhere in the world against "direct or indirect aggression," against "subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." In its negative application it postulated the containment of the Soviet Union everywhere in the world. Thus the Truman Doctrine transformed a concrete interest of the United States in a geographically defined part of the world into a moral principle of worldwide validity, to be applied regardless of the limits of American interests and of American power.

The globalism of the Truman Doctrine was not put to the test of actual performance. Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State, in his speech before the National Press Club of January 12, 1950, cut the doctrine down to the size of American national interest and to the power available to support it. "I hear almost every day someone say," remarked Mr. Acheson, "that the real interest of the United States is to stop the threat of Communism. Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse more completely than that. . . . Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism. . . . It is an important point because people will do more damage and create more misrepresentation in the Far East by saying our interest is merely to stop the spread of Communism than any other way. Our real interest is in those people as people. It is because Communism is hostile to that interest that we want to stop it." It was the contrast between the sweeping generalities of the Truman Doctrine and the discriminating policies actually pursued by the Truman Administration which was to haunt Messrs. Truman and Acheson in the years to come. Their foreign policies, especially in Asia, were judged by the standards of the Truman Doctrine and were found wanting.

The contrast between crusading pronouncements and the actual policies pursued continued, and was even accentuated, under the stewardship of John Foster Dulles, owing, on the one hand, to Mr. Dulles' propensity for grandiose announcements and, on the other, to his innate caution and President Eisenhower's common sense. The only major practical tribute which the Eisenhower Administration paid to the anti-Communist crusade was alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, which were supposed to contain Communism in the Middle East and Asia, respectively.

Putting Theory into Practice

Under President Kennedy, the gap between crusading pronouncements and actual policies started to narrow, due to the intellectual recognition on the part of the Kennedy Administration that Communism could no longer be defined simply, as it could in 1950, as "the spearhead of Russian imperialism." Thus the crusading spirit gave way to a sober differentiating assessment of the bearing the newly emerged, different types of Communism save upon the US national interest.

Under President Johnson pronouncements and policies are now, for the first time since the great transformation of American policy in 1947, very nearly in harmony. What the President has only implied, the Secretaries of State and Defense have clearly stated: We are fighting in Vietnam in order to stop Communism throughout the world. And the President has stated with similar clarity that, "we do not propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere." What in the past we said we were doing or would do but never did, we are now in the process of putting into practice: to stop the expansion of Communism on a global scale by force of arms.

This is a momentous change. It raises three fundamental issues of intellectual and practical importance: First, what is the purpose of foreign policy when it must deal not, or not only, with a hostile power, but with a hostile political movement transcending national boundaries? Second, what is the bearing of the World-Communist movement upon the national interests of the United States? Third, how can the United States deal with the revolutions which might be taken over by Communism?

These questions, more vexing than those with which foreign policy must ordinarily come to terms, are typical for a revolutionary age. Twice before in modern history, these questions had to be answered. They first arose during the last decade of the eighteenth century in England on the occasion of the expansionist policies of revolutionary France. Three great political minds—Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, and William Pitt—debated how to deal with the expansionism of a great power which was also the fountainhead of a universal political religion. Fox held that England was not at all threatened by France or, for that matter, by the principles of the French Revolution, which were a mere domestic concern of France, and that therefore England had no reason to be at war with France. Burke, on the other hand, looked at the issue as "the cause of humanity itself. . . . It is not the cause of nation against nation; but as you will observe, the cause of mankind against those who have projected the subversion of the order of things, under which our part of the world has so long flourished. . . . If I conceive rightly of the spirit of the present combination, it is not at war with France, but with Jacobinism. . . . We are at war with a *principle*, and with an example, of which there is no shutting out by fortresses or excluding by territorial limits. No lines of demarcation can bound the Jacobin empire. It must be extirpated in the place of its origin, or it will not be confined to that place." It was for Pitt, the Prime Minister, to apply the standard of the national interest: "The honorable gentleman defies me to state, in one sentence, what is the object of the war. In one word, I tell him that it is security—security against a danger, the greatest that ever threatened the world—security against a danger which never existed in any past period of society. . . . We saw that it was to be resisted no less by arms abroad, than by precaution at home; that we were to look for protection no less to the courage of our forces than to the wisdom of our councils; no less

to military effort than to legislative enactment."

The other issue arose after the Napoleonic Wars when the absolute monarchies of Europe were threatened on the one hand by liberal revolutions and, on the other, by the imperial ambitions of Russia claiming to fight liberalism anywhere in the name of the Christian principles of government. Faced with this dual danger, Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, opposed the expansion of Russia and refused to oppose or support liberal revolutions *per se*. "It is proposed now," he said to the Russian ambassador in 1820, "to overcome the *revolution*; but so long as this revolution does not appear in more distinct shape, so long as this general principle is only translated into events like those of Spain, Naples and Portugal—which, strictly speaking, are only reforms, or at the most domestic upsets, and do not attack materially any other State—England is not ready to combat it." At the same time he wrote to his brother: "It is not possible for the British Government to take the field in fruitlessly denouncing by a sweeping joint declaration the revolutionary dangers of the present day, to the existence of which they are, nevertheless, sufficiently alive. Nor can they venture to embody themselves *en corps* with the nonrepresentative Governments in what would seem to constitute a scheme of systematic interference in the internal affairs of other States; besides, they do not regard mere declarations as of any real or solid value independent of some practical measure actually resolved upon; and what that measure is which can be generally and universally adopted against bad principles overturning feeble and ill-administered governments, they have never yet been able to divine. . . ."

A foreign policy which takes for its standard the active hostility to a world-wide political movement, such as Jacobinism, liberalism, or Communism, confuses the sphere of philosophic or moral judgment with the realm of political action and for this reason it is bound to fail. For there are narrow limits, defined by the interest at stake and the power available, within which a foreign policy has a chance to be successful, and a foreign policy which would oppose Communist revolution and subversion throughout the world oversteps those limits. It does so in three different respects.

First, the resources of even the most powerful nation are limited. They may suffice for intervening in two or three small countries simultaneously. But if one considers Hanson Baldwin's suggestion that the United States might have to send a million men to Vietnam, one realizes the extent to which available resources fall short of the unlimited commitment.

Second, the task such a foreign policy sets itself is unending. You suppress Communism in South Vietnam and it raises its head, say, in Thailand; you suppress it in the Dominican Republic and it raises its head, say, in Colombia. The successful suppression of revolution in one spot does not discourage revolution elsewhere, provided the objective conditions are favorable. The conjunction between an objective revolutionary situation in large parts of the world with a worldwide political ideology and organization committed to exploit it, makes piecemeal attacks upon individual, acute

trouble spots a hopeless undertaking.

Third, the attack upon a particular revolution as part of a world-wide, anti-revolutionary campaign is bound to have world-wide repercussions. Local successes against a particular revolution may have to be paid for by loss of support elsewhere and even by the strengthening of revolutionary forces throughout the world.

The only standard by which a sound foreign policy must be informed is not moral and philosophic opposition to Communism as such, but the bearing which a particular Communism in a particular country has upon the interests of the United States. That standard was easily applied in 1950 when Communism anywhere in the world could be considered a mere extension of Soviet power and be opposed as such. The task is infinitely more difficult today when Soviet control of the World-Communist movement has been successfully challenged by the competition of China and the reassertion of their particular national interests by Communist governments and parties throughout the world. Yet while the task is very complex, it can be left undone only at the risk of an exhausting and ultimately fruitless indiscriminate crusade which, by dint of its lack of discrimination, is likely to be counterproductive as well; for it tends to restore the very unity of the Communist camp which it is in our interest to prevent.

A sound anti-Communist policy would ask itself at every turn what the relations of this particular Communist government or movement are likely to be with the Soviet Union and China, and how those relations are likely to be influenced by our choice of policy. It would choose a different approach to Cuba, which is a military and political outpost of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere, from that to North Vietnam, which maintains an uneasy balance in its dependence upon the Soviet Union and China, and would prefer not to be subservient to either. Such a policy no doubt entails considerable risks; for the analysis may be mistaken or the policy may fail through miscalculation. Furthermore and most importantly, such a policy is faced with a real dilemma. That dilemma is presented by the prospect of the rise of revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, most, if not all, of which are likely to have a Communist component. In other words, any of these revolutionary movements risks being taken over by Communism.

An Alternative to Crusades

In the face of this risk, we think we can choose between two different courses of action. On the one hand, we can oppose all revolutionary movements around the world. But in consequence of such opposition and in spite of our reformist intentions, we shall then transform ourselves into the anti-revolutionary power *per se* after the model of Metternich's Austria of 150 years ago, and we will find ourselves defending a *status quo* which we know to be unjust and in the long run indefensible. For we know of course that the rational choice open to us is not between the *status quo* and revolution, but between non-Communist and different types

of Communist revolutions. But it is our fear of Communism that forces us into an anti-revolutionary stance *per se*.

On the other hand, if we refrain from intervening against those revolutionary movements, we risk their being taken over by their Communist component. It would then be left to our skill in political manipulation to prevent this Communist take-over from coming about, or if it should come about, to prevent such a Communist revolution from becoming subservient to the Soviet Union or China. The United States would then have to compete with the Soviet Union and China in the sponsorship of revolutions, taking the risk that not all those revolutions would remain under American sponsorship.

Such a policy would make the highest demands on the technical skill, the moral stamina, and the political wisdom of our government, but it is the only one that promises at least a measure of success. The alternative, the anti-Communist crusade, is in comparison simplicity itself. The domestic "consensus" supports it, and it makes but minimum demands on moral discrimination, intellectual subtlety, and political skill. Its implementation is in essence a problem of military logistics: how to get the requisite number of armed men quickly to the theater of revolution. That task is easy, and we have shown ourselves adept at it. Yet the achievement of that task does not solve the problem of revolution. It smothers, as it were, the fire of revolution under a military blanket; but it does not extinguish it. And when that fire breaks out again with increased fury, the assumptions of our policy have left us with no remedy but the commitment of more armed men trying to smother it again.

This policy is bound to be ineffective in the long run against the local revolution to which it is applied. It is also ineffective in its own terms of the anti-Communist crusade. For the very logic which makes us appear as the anti-revolutionary power *per se* surrenders to Communism the sponsorship of revolution everywhere. Thus the anti-Communist crusade achieves what it aims to prevent: the exploitation of the revolutions of the age by the Soviet Union and China.

Finally, our reliance upon a simple anti-Communist stance and its corollary, military intervention, is bound to corrupt our judgment about the nature and the limits of our power. We flatter ourselves to defend right against wrong, to discharge the self-imposed duty to establish a new order throughout the world, and to do so effectively within the limits of military logistics. Thus we may well come to think that all the problems of the political world will yield to moral conviction and military efficiency, and that whatever we want to do we shall be able to do so because we possess those two assets in abundance. "Among precautions against ambition," Edmund Burke warned his countrymen in 1793 under similar conditions, "it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread

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Understanding the Vietcong

Le Viet Nam entre deux paix

by Jean Lacouture.

Editions du Seuil, 266 pp., 17 N.F.

Joseph Kraft

The New York Review

August 5, 1965

High strategic themes, bureaucratic interests, intellectual baggage and many other kinds of junk have been piled on to the war in Vietnam. It has been called a fatal test of will between Communism and freedom. It has been described as the critical battle in the struggle between China and the United States. It has also been described as the critical battle in the struggle between China and the Soviet Union. On its outcome there is supposed to rest the future of Southeast Asia; and so it has also been sometimes described as the critical battle between China and India. At a minimum the Dr. Strangeloves of "sublimated war" claim that Vietnam poses the question whether a nuclear power can mobilize the kind of force required to contain guerrilla warfare. And with so much at stake it seems to make sense that the greatest power on earth should send as ambassador to a kind of Asian Ruritania its leading military man and, on two occasions, one of its best-known political figures.

To those who think it does make sense, which seems to include practically everybody in the United States, Jean Lacouture's new book on Vietnam will come as a kind of revelation. He announces his almost revolutionary theme in the opening sentence: "Vietnam," he writes, "exists." His book is about a particular place and a struggle for primacy there. It is, in other words, a political book. It deals with the elements and forces of the conflict, not as if they were apocalyptic and millennial events but as political phenomena. To read Lacouture after a dose of the official and even the journalistic literature which we get in this country is to pass from griffins and unicorns to Darwin and Mendel.

For writing a non-mythological political analysis of Vietnam, Lacouture has the ideal background. As a distinguished correspondent for various journals, including *Le Monde*, he has been to Vietnam repeatedly since he first went there on the staff of General Leclerc in 1945. He has visited both North and South Vietnam several times.

* *Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy*, Oceana Publications, N. Y.

He has written on his subject often and at length, notably in a biographical study of Ho Chi Minh and as co-author of a book on the Geneva truce of 1954. He knows all the leading figures on all sides from way back. Nor is he a narrow specialist. After a particularly baffling encounter with a Buddhist monk, for example, he can write: "Our seminars also train specialists in verbal equivocation and suave silences, but never, in our climate, has the sacerdotal smile taken on such an evasive efficaciousness." Moreover, the politics of underdeveloped countries, so mysterious to most of us, and so parochial to those who know only a single country, are familiar stuff to him. With his wife Simone, Lacouture has written the best study to date of Colonel Nasser's Egypt; and one of the best on Morocco since independence. While obviously a *pièce d'occasion*, his present book on Vietnam is of the same high quality.

His starting point is the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Just how the United States became connected with Diem has become a matter of controversy. *Ramparts* magazine has recently published an account purporting to show that a knot of American Catholic politicians and professional anti-Communists, depending largely upon Cardinal Spellman, promoted our support of the Diem regime. Perhaps. But history has a way of demolishing theories that trace large consequences to little groups of men. Far more important is the point urged in a brilliant study of the Vietnamese war by the international lawyer, Victor Bator*. Bator's argument is that in 1954, for reasons of domestic politics, the Eisenhower-Dulles regime broke with the policy of moving in concert with Britain and France and tried to establish South Vietnam as a bastion of anti-communist resistance. President Diem was merely the vehicle for that effort.

He had little chance to succeed. Not because, as some say, South Vietnam cannot exist as a separate political entity. In Vietnam too, it is different in the South. South Vietnam in fact is

one of the most richly diversified areas in the world. Its topography includes mountainous areas peopled by primitive tribes, arid plateaux, and a great alluvial plain. It is a leading producer of rice—a crop requiring the kind of intense personal cultivation that breeds an independent peasantry. The diversity fostered by occupation is further promoted by religious custom: South Vietnam's 14 million people include large numbers of Catholics, Buddhists and Confucians, and all of them practice a kind of ancestor worship that places special emphasis on local custom. While Vietnamese political parties in the Western sense have existed only as affiliates of those that had grown up around the old political capital of Hanoi in the North, there remained—and remain—a multitude of local Southern sects (Lacouture likens them to "armed leagues") that mixed banditry with religion. Thanks to a loose provincial reign, the French, as Lacouture points out, had governed this melange for decades with no more difficulties than those found in the sleepiest of domestic Departments—"Herault and Lot et Garonne." Painly, any Southern regime that was likely to succeed would have to be pluralistic, offering great scope for local differences—and this was especially true for the regime of President Diem, a Catholic aristocrat from the high plains and thus markedly different from the majority of Vietnamese.

But if there was one thing the Diem regime lacked, it was sympathy for pluralism. The ruling family was imbued "with an extra touch of fervor, something of the absolute." The President had an "attachment to the ancient society of Annam—high aristocracy, closed castes, intellectual hierarchies . . . he wanted to revive the old order, the morality of the fathers, the respect for the master." His brother and political counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu saw in the "strategic hamlets" a re-creation of the fortified towns of the Middle Ages that he had studied as a budding medi-

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evalist at the Ecole des Chartres. Another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, who ruled the northern provinces, lived in the old family mansion, dressed in the ancient Vietnamese style, and slept on the floor. Madame Nhu's war on night life and dancing was thus not a personal aberration, but a true expression of the absolute traditionalism that typified the regime.

Confronting a diversity of political factions, however, single-minded dogmatism can prevail only in a climate of strife—real or contrived. In the beginning the Diem regime had to fight against the sects and the remnants of French influence. In the course of this struggle President Diem evicted the former Emperor, Bao Dai, and became President "in a plebiscite as honest as could be expected." But having taken the sects and the crown, the Diem regime did not know how to use its victory to develop harmony. "Having won a battle, it preferred war to peace... In 1955 any opponent was denounced as a relic of the sects of feudal rebels supported by colonialism. Beginning in 1956, any opponent is called a Communist." It was in this context that the regime initiated in 1956 a campaign against the Vietcong—a name manufactured by the regime and supposed to mean Vietnamese Communists, but actually embracing a far wider spectrum of political opinion. In the same spirit the Saigon regime, against the advice of the American Ambassador, publicly abrogated the clause of the 1954 Geneva Agreement calling for re-unification of Vietnam through free elections—a clause that Hanoi could certainly not have accepted at the time. But in the process of fighting the Vietcong, the regime called forth the two forces that were to prove its undoing.

One of these was the army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVIN as it came to be called. In connection with ARVIN, it is worth noting one of the intellectual sleights-of-hand common to Americans who believe it is good for this country to support reactionary governments abroad. After all, they say in the Montesquieu manner, democracy cannot be exported; the conditions that promote free institutions in the United States do not exist elsewhere, and one should not impose American mores uncritically. True enough. But this is not a creature the American liberal. On the contrary, the group that most uncritically projects American ways, that is most ready to overlook and override local

custom, and to ignore the tradition of centuries, is the American military. And nothing proves it better than ARVIN.

It is an army created in the image of our own. It wears American parade dress and American fatigues. It rides around in jeeps and helicopters and jet planes. It is organized in corps, divisions, and companies and has special forces and ranger battalions. It has most of the weaponry available to American forces. It is full of keen young officers, trained at staff schools in the United States, bursting with energy and with clear answers to cloudy questions. What it does not have, of course, is the cultural base of the American army. It does not, to be specific, have a strong sense of discipline, nor does it have a tradition that discourages meddling in political affairs. On the contrary, ARVIN was called into being by political affairs; and the younger the officers the more ardently political they tend to be. How could anyone imagine that a force so modern in its outlook, so uninhibited and unrestricted in its background, would for long yield pride of place to a regime as old-fashioned and backward-looking as the Diem government? As Lacouture points out, military plotting against the government got under way as soon as the army was organized. In 1960 and again in 1962 attempted military coups came very close to toppling the regime. Only by fantastic juggling, only by setting unit against unit and commander against commander and by planting spies and rumors everywhere was the regime able to maintain its hold over the army at all. It is typical that on the eve of the coup that succeeded, the regime itself was planning a fake coup to discover which of its generals were loyal. Sooner or later, in short, a military coup would have unseated Diem. As much as anything in history can be, his undoing by his own praetorian guard was inevitable—a consideration to bear in mind when there develops in Washington a hunt for scapegoats who will be charged with having lost Vietnam by causing the downfall of the Diem regime.

The second force brought into being by the absolutism of the regime was the Vietcong. In keeping with the Geneva Accords, almost all the guerilla forces, and especially their leaders, who had fought for Ho Chi Minh against the French moved above the 17th parallel to North Vietnam. There remained, however, in scattered areas

of the South, Communists loyal to the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi. Precisely because they were disciplined Communists, loyal to the party line, they did not initiate trouble against the Diem regime. For Hanoi had troubles of its own—first the re-settlement; then construction of new industry; and at all times a chronic food shortage and great difficulties with the peasantry. Feeling itself far more vulnerable than the Saigon regime, the last thing Hanoi wanted to do was to give the Diem government an excuse for intervention. For that reason, Hanoi protested in only the most perfunctory way when the clause providing for re-unification through free elections was unilaterally abrogated by Saigon. For the same reason, Hanoi tried repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) to make deals with the Saigon regime, offering to trade its manufactures for foodstuffs. And for exactly the same reason, Hanoi kept the Communists in the South under wraps. As one Communist quoted by Lacouture said later: "Between 1954 and 1958 we were pacifist opportunists. We hesitated to draw conclusions from the Diemist dictatorship and its excesses."

But, as Lacouture shows, other victims of the Diem regime were under no such discipline. Tribal leaders, local notables, independent peasants and smallholders, not to mention intellectuals and professional men in Saigon, found themselves threatened by the militancy of the regime. Many were thrown into prison—for example, the present chief of state, Phan Khac Suu, and one of the more recent Premiers, Phan Huy Quat. Others resisted, and inevitably they looked to the Communists for support. Thus local pressure for the Communists to start things began to build up. As one Vietcong leader told Lacouture: "There was pressure at the base. An old peasant said to me: 'If you don't join the fight we're through with you.'" (I have heard very similar explanations in my own talks with Vietcong officials.) In short, like almost all rebellions, the Vietcong revolt was not set off by some master planner working from the outside. It was generated by local conditions.

The course of events outlined by Lacouture follows this pattern exactly. The formal establishment of the National Liberation Front, or political arm of the Vietcong, was initiated at a meeting held in the U Minh forest of southeast South Vietnam in March,

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COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

By JUAN BOSCH

War/Peace Report, July, 1965

Saturday Review, August 7, 1965

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.

AFTER the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo, the Department of State first released a list of fifty-three Dominican Communists; then a list of fifty-eight; and finally, a list of seventy-seven.

When I was President of the Dominican Republic, I calculated that in Santo Domingo there were between 700 and 800 Communists, and I estimated the number of Communist sympathizers at between 3,000 and 3,500. These 700 or 800 Communists were divided into three groups, of which, in my judgment, the largest was the Popular Dominican Movement, with perhaps between 400 and 500 members in the entire country; next came the Popular Socialist Party with somewhat less, around 300 to 400; and then, in a number that in my opinion did not reach fifty, the Communists had infiltrated the June 14th Movement, some of them in executive posts and others at lower levels.

I ought to make clear that in 1963 in the Dominican Republic there was much political confusion, and a large number of people, especially middle-class youth, did not know for certain what they were and what they wanted to be, whether democrats or Communists. But that has happened in almost all countries where there have been prolonged dictatorships, once the dictatorships pass. After a certain time has elapsed and the political panorama becomes clarified, many people who began their public life as Communists pass into the democratic camp. In 1963 the Dominican Republic needed time for the democratic system to clear up the confusion, and in a sense the time was used that way, since 700 or 800 Communists, divided in three groups, with sympathizers numbering between 3,000 and 3,500, could in no case—not even with arms in their hands—take power or even represent a serious threat.

If there weren't enough Communists to take power, there was, on the other hand, a strong sentiment against persecution of the Communists. This feeling developed because during his long tyranny Trujillo always accused his adversaries of being Communists. Because of that, anti-Communism and Trujilloism ended up being equivalent terms in the Dominican political vocabulary. Moreover, the instruments of oppression—the police and the armed forces—remained the same in 1963—with the same men who had served under Trujillo. If I had used them against the Communists I would have ended up as their prisoner,

and they, for their part, would have completely destroyed the Dominican democratic forces. For those men, having learned from Trujillo, there was no distinction between democrats and Communists; anyone who opposed any of their violence, or even their corruption, was a Communist and ought to be annihilated.

MY presumption was correct, as events have shown. From the dawn of September 25, the day of the coup d'état against the government I headed, the police began to persecute and beat without mercy all the non-Communist democrats who in the opinion of the military chiefs would be able to resist the coup. It was known that in all the country not one Communist had infiltrated my party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), but still the leaders and members of that party were persecuted as Communists. The chief of police himself insulted the prisoners by calling them Communists. Many leaders of the PRD were deported, and—a curious fact—numerous Communists who had been in Europe, Russia, and Cuba were permitted to return. But the leaders of the PRD were not permitted to return, and if one did he was immediately deported again. During the nineteen months of the government of Donald Reid, thousands of democrats from the PRD and hundreds from the Social Christian Party and the June 14th Movement were jailed, deported, and beaten in a barbaric manner; the headquarters of these three parties were assaulted or destroyed by the police. All the vehicles, desks, typewriters and other valuable effects of the PRD were robbed by the police. In the months of May and June, 1964, more than 1,000 members of the PRD who had been accused of being Communists were in jail at one time.

That "anti-Communist" fury launched against the democratic Dominicans was an important factor in the eruption of the April revolution because the people were fighting to regain their right to live under a legal order, not a police state. If it had been I who unleashed that fury, the revolution would have been against the democratic regime, not in favor of democracy.

It was not necessary to be a political genius to realize that if "anti-Communist" persecution began in the Dominican Republic, the police and the military would also persecute the democrats. Neither need one be a political genius to understand that what the country

needed was not stimulation of the mad forces of Trujilloism which still existed in the police and the military, but rather the strengthening of democracy by demonstrating to the Dominicans in practice that what was best for them and the country was to live under the legal order of a democratic regime.

Now then, in the Dominican picture there was a force that in my opinion was determining the pointer of the political balance, in terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that force was the June 14th Movement.

I have said that according to my calculations there was in the June 14th Movement an infiltration of less than fifty Communists, some of them in executive positions and others at lower levels. But I must state that control of this party, at all levels, was held by an overwhelming majority of young people who were not Communists and some of whom were strongly anti-Communist. How can one explain that there should be Communists together with non-Communists and active anti-Communists? There is one reason: the June 14th Movement was based, in all its breadth and at all its levels, on intense nationalism, and that nationalism was manifested above all in terms of strong anti-Americanism. To convert that *anti-norteamericanismo* into *dominicanismo* there was only one way: maintain for a long time a democratic regime with a dynamic and creative sense.

IKNEW that if the country saw the establishment of a government that was not elected by the people—that was not constitutional and not respectful of civil liberties—the Communists would attribute this new government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew that in view of the anti-Americanism of the youth of the middle class—especially in the June 14th Movement—Communist influence would increase. The equilibrium of the political balance was, then, in that party. Any sensible Dominican politician realized that. The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican Republic did not have sensible politicians, or at least not enough of them. The appetites for power held in check for a third of a century overflowed, and the politicians turned to conspiring with Trujillo's military men. The immediate result was the coup of September, 1963; the delayed result was the revolution of April, 1965.

It is easy to understand why Dominican youth of the middle class was so nationalistic. This youth loved its coun-

try, wanted to see it morally and politically clean, hoped for its economic development, and thought—with reason—that it was Trujillo who blocked morality, liberty, and development of the country. It is also easy to understand why this nationalism took the form of anti-Americanism. It was simply a feeling of frustration. This youth, which had not been able to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo was in power because of his support by the United States. For them, the United States and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed for what was happening in the Dominican Republic, and for that reason their hate for Trujillo was naturally converted into feelings of anti-Americanism.

I am not discussing here whether they were right or wrong; I am simply stating the fact. I know that in the United States there are people who supported Trujillo and others who attacked him. But the young Dominicans knew only the former and not the latter, since Trujillo took care to give the greatest publicity possible to any demonstration of support, however small, that was offered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citizen, whether he was a Senator or an ordinary tourist; and on the other hand, he took great pains to prevent even the smallest notice in the Dominican Republic of any attack by an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican youth knew only that Trujillo had defenders in the United States, not that he had enemies.

For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creating with the Dominican people an image of unity between society and government that can only be compared with what has been produced in countries with Communist regimes. For more than thirty years in the Dominican Republic nothing happened—nothing *could* happen—without an express order from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican youth this image was generalized, and they thought that in the United States also nothing could happen without an order from whoever governed in Washington. Thus, for them, when an American Senator, newspaperman or businessman expressed his support of Trujillo, that person was talking by order of the President of the United States. To this very day, a large number of Dominicans of the middle class think that everything a U.S. citizen says, his government is saying too.

The pointer of the political balance, as I said earlier, was in the June 14th Movement, which was saturated with anti-Americanism. This group included the most fervent youths and even those best qualified technically—but not politically—as well as the more numerous nucleus of middle-class youth; it also constituted the social sector where Communist sermons could have the most effect and from whence could come the resolute leaders that the Communists lacked. Trujillo had tortured, assassi-

nated and made martyrs of hundreds of members of the June 14th Movement. To persecute these youths was to send them into the arms of Communism, to give strength to the arguments of the few Communists that had infiltrated the Movement. The Communists said that the democracy that I headed received its orders from Washington, the same as had Trujillo, to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little by little, as the days passed, the non-Communist and anti-Communist members of the June 14th Movement were gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their companions that my democratic government neither persecuted them nor took orders from Washington. In four years, the democratic but nationalistic sector of the June 14th Movement—which was in the overwhelming majority—would have ended the Communist influence and made itself into a firm support of Dominican democracy.

THE weakness of the Dominican Communists was also shown by the activity of the Social Christian Party, which presented itself as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted the Communists everywhere, to the point that they could not show themselves in public. But when the Social Christians realized that the best source of young people in the country was the June 14th Movement, they stopped their street fighting against the Communists and began a campaign against *imperialismo norteamericano*. When they showed with this battle cry that they were not a pro-U.S. party, they began to attract young adherents who had been members of the June 14th Movement as well as many others who already had a clear idea of what they wanted to be: nationalists and democrats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders came to understand that the key to the Dominican political future lay in assuring the nationalistic youth of a worthy and constructive democracy.

What the Social Christians learned by 1963 would have been understood by other political groups if the Dominican democracy had been given time. But this was not to be. Reactionaries in the Dominican Republic and the United States set themselves ferociously against the Dominican democracy under the slogan that my government was "soft" on the Communists.

This is the point at which to analyze "weakness" and "force," if those two terms signify opposite concepts. There are two ways to face problems, particularly political ones. One is to use intelligence and the other is to use force. According to this theory, intelligence is weak, and the use of intelligence, a sign of weakness.

I think that a subject so complex as political feelings and ideas ought to be treated with intelligence. I think also

that force is a concept that expresses different values, as can be seen in the United States or in the Dominican Republic. In the U.S., the use of force means the application of the law—without crimes, without torture, without medieval barbarism; in the Dominican Republic, it means quite the contrary: one does not apply the law without instruments of torture, not excluding assassination. When a Dominican policeman says of a person that he is a Communist, he is saying that he, the policeman, has the full right to beat him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since this policeman does not know how to distinguish between a democrat and a Communist, he is quite apt to beat, shoot and kill a democrat.

It is not easy to change the mentality of the people who become policemen in the Dominican Republic, especially with little time to do it. When the New Englanders burned women as witches, those who did the burning believed absolutely that they were destroying witches. Today, nobody believes that they were witches. But it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo. When a Dominican policeman is told that he should persecute a young man because he is a Communist, the policeman believes with all his soul that his duty is to kill the youth.

The problem that my democratic government faced was to choose between the use of intelligence and the use of force, while the time passed during which the hot-headed youths and uneducated police learned to distinguish between democracy and Communism. And if someone says that in this period the Communists would be able to gain strength and take power, I say and guarantee that they could not do it. Only a dictatorship can give to the Communists the arguments they need for progress in the Dominican Republic; under a democratic regime the democratic conscience would outstrip the Communists.

TO return to the concepts of intelligence and force, I think that they apply to Communism itself in its fight for the conquest of power. No Communist party, in no country of the world, has been able to reach power solely because it was strong; it has needed, besides, a leader of exceptional capacity. The Dominican Communists have not had and do not have force, and they have not had and do not have a leader comparable to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and according to my prediction, they are not going to have either the force or the leader in the foreseeable future.

Dominican Communism is in its infancy, and began, as did Venezuelan Communism, with internal divisions that will require many years to overcome. Only the long dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez was able to create the right atmosphere for the different groups of

(continued on page eight)

our being too much dreaded. . . . We may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state

of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin." Pitt and Castlereagh heeded that warning. Our future and the future of the world will depend on our heeding it as well.

MORGENTHAU (above)
KRAFT (below)

1960. According to Lacouture, the chief document before the meeting was a letter urging the establishment of the Liberation Front written from a Saigon prison by a non-Communist who is now head of the Front, Nguyen Huu Tho. While at least two of those at the March meeting seem to have been Communists, most of those on the spot were not. The chief items in the declaration that was then put out were purely local grievances. And it was only after the Front was already in motion, in September, 1960, that Hanoi gave it explicit support. As Lacouture puts it: "The leaders in Hanoi did not take this turn [toward backing revolt in the south] except under the express demand and the moral pressure of the local militants."

Once Hanoi had formally supported the Front, there was no backing down. With the United States supporting the Saigon regime, there came about the famous build-up of military operations. In failing to see the complexity of the domestic pressures that drove the United States to underwrite Saigon, Lacouture misses a vital point—the only flaw in his book. But how little of the underlying

political situation has really been changed by this build-up! The confrontation, to be sure, has become more dangerous. The American role as backer of the Saigon regime, and especially its army, is now more exposed. So is Hanoi's role as supplier of men and weapons to the Vietcong. Still, there remains some independence in Saigon—witness, the Buddhists' maneuverings and the government crises that regularly catch American officials by surprise. The National Liberation Front retains a Central Committee that seems to be less than a third Communist, and that is, as it always was, especially oriented toward the problems of South Vietnam. While it is true that more Communists are to be found on the intermediary levels of the N.L.F., neither Lacouture nor others who know the Vietcong leaders well believe that they are fighting in order to impose a North Vietnamese Communist dictatorship on the South. The chief problem remains what it always was—how to find a political means of reconciling the great diversity of interest and opinion in South Vietnam.

Official apologists for our present policy, while acknowledging its dangers, often insist that there is no alternative.

This is a little like the peddler selling pills during the Lisbon earthquake who replied, when asked whether the pills would do any good: No, but what do you have that's better? The comparison would be even more apt if the peddler had had a hand in starting the earthquake. Certainly it is true that the alternatives have been obscured by the resolute refusal of most of the American press to study carefully the politics of the war, including the politics of the Vietcong. But in fact there remains an alternative well known to all politically alert Vietnamese (though it is difficult to voice because of increasingly harsh American policy.) It is the alternative of negotiations between the Saigon government and the Vietcong. Such talks are an absolute pre-condition to any reconciling of local differences. However difficult to arrange they may now appear, direct discussions with the Vietcong will sooner or later have to take place if there is to be a settlement in Vietnam. For a struggle that began locally—and this is the central point to emerge from Lacouture's book—can also best be settled locally.

BOSCH

Communists of the Venezuela of 1945 so that they could come together into a single party, and the lack of a leader of exceptional capacity has, in spite of the power of the party, voided the chance of Venezuelan Communism coming to power.

How many Communists did France have? How many Italy? But neither French nor Italian Communism ever had leaders capable of carrying it to power. In the Dominican case, there are neither the numbers nor the leadership.

I cannot hope that men like Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois

will know these things, will think about them, and will act accordingly. But logically I had the right to expect that in Washington there would be someone who would understand the Dominican political scene and the role that the Communists could play in my country. As is evident, I was mistaken. In Washington they know the Dominican problems only as they are told of them by Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois.

The lack of adequate knowledge is tantamount to the nullification of the power of intelligence, above all in politics, and this can only lead to sorry results. When intelligence is canceled, its place is occupied by fear. Today there

has spread over the countries of America a fear of Communism that is leading us all to kill democracy for fear that democracy is the mask of Communism.

It seems to me we have reached the point where we consider democracy incapable of resolving the problems of our peoples. And if we have truly arrived at this point, we have nothing to offer humanity. We are denying our faith, we are destroying the columns of the temple that throughout our life has been our shelter.

Are we really doing this? No, I should not say this. It is the others. Because in spite of everything that has happened, I continue to believe that democracy is the dwelling place of human dignity.

We urge that four articles denied us be read: three editorials by Philip Geyelin in the Wall St. Journal (Aug. 3, 24, and

25), and Henry Steele Commager's "A Historian Looks at Our Political Morality" (Saturday Review, July 10).

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