

"in view of the likelihood that the enemy may be fully acclimatized" to high elevations, the United States must be able to overcome the environmental effects of such regions on troop performance. Since the only "enemy" likely to be acclimatized to 10,000-

foot-plus elevations are the inhabitants of the Himalayan region, it is becoming ominously clear that the U.S. counterinsurgency intervention in South Asia may some day stretch from the beaches of Danang to the furthest reaches of Nepal and Tibet. □

## WAR RESEARCH AT STANFORD

# SIDESTEPPING THE MILITANTS

### LARRY SCHWARTZ

*Mr. Schwartz was completing his graduate studies in journalism at Stanford last year, when the demonstrations he discusses occurred.*

Early in 1970, the trustees of Stanford University announced terms of an agreement to relinquish legal ownership and control of the Stanford Research Institute—a facility established in 1946 to "aid and supplement scientific research at Stanford." This divestiture appears to be a reaction to campus demonstrations last May in which students and faculty protested research which they claimed was directly related to U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia.

The final decision of the trustees—which provides for SRI, in effect, to buy itself from Stanford—is in line with a recommendation made last May by a study committee authorized by the Stanford president. But it does not meet the principal demand of the student-faculty protesters, which was that the university community exercise greater control over the institute's research. It does not end SRI's connection with war research; it merely removes the Stanford name (but not its influence) from SRI. And the institute continues to conduct the types of research against which the demonstrations were directed.

During the campus demonstrations, students turned up voluminous data which they said showed links between SRI research goals, the university's on-campus military research, and university trustees who were officers of companies that produce military materials and were in some cases also on the SRI board of directors. The decision of the trustees is an example of how a university reacts to well-documented charges coupled with student militancy.

The student demonstrations against SRI and war-related research began in April after the Stanford trustees flatly refused to consider five demands put forth by a coalition of "concerned students and faculty." The demands of this coalition—later to become the April 3 Movement (A3M)—were:

(1) End chemical and biological warfare research at SRI.

(2) Bring SRI under closer control of the university community and establish guidelines for socially acceptable research.

(3) End foreign and domestic counterinsurgency research at SRI and Stanford.

(4) End classified research at SRI and Stanford.

(5) End research in support of wars in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

The A3M charged that the Stanford research complex was a political tool of the government, responding mainly to the desires of the Defense Department, and that both the university and the research institute were run by men who had a vested interest in heavy spending for military research. The ultimate goal of the A3M was to convince this same group of "educator-industrialists" that SRI ought to be a peace-oriented research center; that would, of course, imply the complete disentanglement of SRI from U.S. military efforts in Southeast Asia.

The demands of the A3M were supported by information uncovered through investigations into the research priorities of the university and the institute begun by Students for a Democratic Society as early as 1966. The students found that over the years SRI had come to depend heavily on Department of Defense funds. According to Stanford's own SRI study committee, approximately 50 per cent of the institute's \$64.2 million income (in 1968) was from the Defense Department.

The students also found that SRI held two contracts, totaling \$404,000, that were directly related to chemical and biological warfare research. And "at the same time," according to A3M literature, "in 1968 SRI did \$6,246,000 (10 per cent of its funding) in counterinsurgency work for the Pentagon on Southeast Asia."

The students named thirty-seven SRI contracts, beginning in 1966, that fell within the category of counterinsurgency research. (The A3M uses a dictionary of military terms to define counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat a subversive insurgency.") Three of the nine 1968 counterinsurgency projects were "Human Factors in Thai Counterinsurgency Communications"; "The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya"; "Insurgency in Northeastern Thailand and Smuggling and Illegal Entry Across the Mekong River Borders."

