

"in view of the likelihood that the enemy may be fully 'acclimatized'" to high elevations, the United States must be able to overcome the environmental effects of such regions on troop performance. Since the only "enemy" likely to be acclimatized to 10,000-

foot-plus elevations are the inhabitants of the Himalayan region, it is becoming ominously clear that the U.S. counterinsurgency intervention in South Asia may some day stretch from the beaches of Danang to the furthest reaches of Nepal and Tibet. □

## WAR RESEARCH AT STANFORD

# SIDESTEPPING THE MILITANTS

### LARRY SCHWARTZ

*Mr. Schwartz was completing his graduate studies in journalism at Stanford last year, when the demonstrations he discusses occurred.*

Early in 1970, the trustees of Stanford University announced terms of an agreement to relinquish legal ownership and control of the Stanford Research Institute—a facility established in 1946 to "aid and supplement scientific research at Stanford." This divestiture appears to be a reaction to campus demonstrations last May in which students and faculty protested research which they claimed was directly related to U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia.

The final decision of the trustees—which provides for SRI, in effect, to buy itself from Stanford—is in line with a recommendation made last May by a study committee authorized by the Stanford president. But it does not meet the principal demand of the student-faculty protesters, which was that the university community exercise greater control over the institute's research. It does not end SRI's connection with war research; it merely removes the Stanford name (but not its influence) from SRI. And the institute continues to conduct the types of research against which the demonstrations were directed.

During the campus demonstrations, students turned up voluminous data which they said showed links between SRI research goals, the university's on-campus military research, and university trustees who were officers of companies that produce military materials and were in some cases also on the SRI board of directors. The decision of the trustees is an example of how a university reacts to well-documented charges coupled with student militancy.

The student demonstrations against SRI and war-related research began in April after the Stanford trustees flatly refused to consider five demands put forth by a coalition of "concerned students and faculty." The demands of this coalition—later to become the April 3 Movement (A3M)—were:

(1) End chemical and biological warfare research at SRI.

(2) Bring SRI under closer control of the university community and establish guidelines for socially acceptable research.

(3) End foreign and domestic counterinsurgency research at SRI and Stanford.

(4) End classified research at SRI and Stanford.

(5) End research in support of wars in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

The A3M charged that the Stanford research complex was a political tool of the government, responding mainly to the desires of the Defense Department, and that both the university and the research institute were run by men who had a vested interest in heavy spending for military research. The ultimate goal of the A3M was to convince this same group of "educator-industrialists" that SRI ought to be a peace-oriented research center; that would, of course, imply the complete disentanglement of SRI from U.S. military efforts in Southeast Asia.

The demands of the A3M were supported by information uncovered through investigations into the research priorities of the university and the institute begun by Students for a Democratic Society as early as 1966. The students found that over the years SRI had come to depend heavily on Department of Defense funds. According to Stanford's own SRI study committee, approximately 50 per cent of the institute's \$64.2 million income (in 1968) was from the Defense Department.

The students also found that SRI held two contracts, totaling \$404,000, that were directly related to chemical and biological warfare research. And "at the same time," according to A3M literature, "in 1968 SRI did \$6,246,000 (10 per cent of its funding) in counterinsurgency work for the Pentagon on Southeast Asia."

The students named thirty-seven SRI contracts, beginning in 1966, that fell within the category of counterinsurgency research. (The A3M uses a dictionary of military terms to define counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat a subversive insurgency.") Three of the nine 1968 counterinsurgency projects were "Human Factors in Thai Counterinsurgency Communications"; "The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya"; "Insurgency in Northeastern Thailand and Smuggling and Illegal Entry Across the Mekong River Borders."

The A3M leaflet listing the thirty-seven projects ends: "In any event, counterinsurgency research clearly has been and is being done at SRI and protests that counterinsurgency work cannot be eliminated because it cannot be precisely defined serve only to allow the continuation of the SRI research that has aided American military, political, and economic control of Southeast Asia."

The students claimed that the following summary of SRI policy statements shows that the direction of research was part of a political strategy:

(1) Jesse Hobson, SRI's first president, stated in 1951 that, "This nation occupies 6 per cent of the land area of the world, has 7 per cent of the world's population, but it now possesses 67 per cent of the world's wealth. . . . Research must be the heart, the foundation, the life blood of our present defense economy if we are to maintain this position."

(2) Ed Robinson, vice president of SRI International, told a gathering of Stanford alumni in 1957, that "the free world must not lose Southeast Asia . . . as it had already lost China."

(3) A 1969 SRI International report states, "SRI is dedicated to the strengthening of private business on an international scale and our objective is to do everything within our power to develop this private sector as the basic factor in economic strength and progress."

The students concluded that by supporting this strategy the Stanford trustees were working for their own "selfish" interests. Trustee Ernest Arbuckle is chairman of the board of directors of SRI and dean of the Stanford Business School. He and trustee Edmund Littlefield also serve as directors of both Wells Fargo, the nation's eleventh largest bank, and Utah Mining and Construction, a firm that builds military air bases in Vietnam and owns mining operations in Latin America. Trustee Charles Ducommun is a director of Lockheed. Trustee William Hewlett owns and directs Hewlett-Packard, a leading manufacturer of electronic measuring devices that have direct war and defense applications. (Former trustee Packard, the other half of Hewlett-Packard, is now Assistant Secretary of Defense.) Mr. Hewlett also directs FMC Corporation, a manufacturer of armed personnel carriers and a wide variety of munitions. Trustee Roger Lewis is president and board chairman of General Dynamics. Trustee Tom Jones represents Northrup Aviation, a manufacturer of fighter aircraft and CS tear gas—used in Vietnam by the U.S. Army and in this country by the police. Trustee Dean Watkins, former professor of electrical engineering at Stanford, is an owner-director of Watkins-Johnson, a company manufacturing electronic components for the Pentagon. Other trustees have oil holdings, are corporate lawyers, or hold appointed governmental, judicial or Cabinet positions.

Several trustees are also involved with the university through the Stanford Industrial Park—university-owned land leased to private businesses for the construction of manufacturing, laboratory and re-

search facilities. Among corporations with industrial operations in the Park are Watkins-Johnson, Lockheed and Hewlett-Packard.

According to Stanford's SDS chapter, "These are the men who run Stanford. They are not educators. Understanding the bases of power from which they qualified for positions on the Stanford board is a first step toward understanding the priorities they bring to Stanford."

On campus, the students discovered classified contracts that have direct and practical military applications and that are, in fact, used in Vietnam to counter North Vietnamese insurgency. The Electronics Laboratories on the Stanford campus actually held \$2.2 million in classified contracts, but the brunt of the A3M's on-campus attack centered on the Systems Technique Lab located in the Applied Electronics Laboratory. According to the pamphlet "The Goods on AEL," published during the eight-day occupation of that lab by the A3M, ". . . STL is an on-campus research program whose objective is to offer a close and immediate coupling between the results of academic research programs and the most advanced needs of military electronics in such areas as counter measures." The Systems Technique Lab concentrated on electronics research—jamming, deceiving, evading, or destroying hostile radar.

The A3M charged that work done in this lab in the late fifties "contributed directly to the present generation of highly sophisticated electronic equipment now being used on the ground and in the air over Vietnam." William Rambo, director of the Electrical Engineering Department's research program and head of AEL stated that "if the electronic warfare research program hadn't had some military impact over the past sixteen years it would not have been re-funded." The A3M claimed that "STL holds six classified contracts worth over \$1 million." Former trustee David Packard contributed funds to construct this particular lab.

The students' charges were well-researched and cogently presented. What did they accomplish? Today the score card shows that the militant students and faculty achieved one and one-half of their five demands. As part of the break with the university, the board of directors of SRI announced the end of all further research in chemical and biological warfare. The faculty of Stanford University voted to phase out classified research projects on campus. But the trustees of Stanford University have evaded the main thrust of the demands by cutting the legal ties with SRI, selling it (for \$25 million) to the board of directors of the institute. In so doing they have removed the university from any direct relationship with the research programs and strategies of the institute. But SRI's research goals, priorities and directions remain unchanged. The research to which the students objected continues to be done. SRI is still involved more in "defense" work than in research devoted to solving man's pressing social problems. □