

April 28, 1969

To: Members of the Academic Senate

From: The April 3rd Movement

Re: Your Tuesday meeting on SRI

Dear Professor,

We have heard that the Academic Senate is ready to make these recommendations on SRI:

- 1) No sale of SRI, but the formation of a new committee to study the Stanford-SRI relationship.
- 2) The formation of some kind of representative body within the SRI staff, so the staff can gain a voice in future deliberations.

In themselves, these ideas are excellent. Certainly SRI shouldn't be sold (even if there were a buyer). Certainly we need to find out more about the possibilities for ties between Stanford and SRI. And certainly the SRI staff should strive for a semblance of representative government.

After passing those resolutions, however, we hope you will not adjourn. A large order of business will remain on your agenda: what to do about the research that SRI shouldn't be doing.

It is commonplace knowledge that SRI is heavily engaged in counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia, and, were it not for a recent sudden cutback, would also be heavily committed to CBW research. By agreeing to consider the SRI Study Committee report at all, we believe you have implicitly acknowledged that the Stanford faculty has the power and responsibility to deal with the SRI question--in its entirety.

Moreover, your Steering Committee has already raised its voice against CBW at SRI. At the April 8 meeting of the Board of Trustees, Prof. Leonard Schiff read a statement which asked for a moratorium on all existing and proposed CBW at SRI. (The Trustees, under great pressure, agreed to a moratorium on new CBW contracts.)

CBW is a simple issue. We hope that you will at least repeat the Steering Committee's request in any resolutions you pass concerning SRI. To many of us, however, counterinsurgency is a far more urgent issue. If you have examined the research titles on pp. 44-45 of the Study Committee report, it is clear that our SRI affiliate is busy laying the groundwork for a broader U.S. military intervention in Thailand. (See also the enclosed additional information.)

You may not feel that you have sufficient information to ask for the same moratorium on counterinsurgency as for CBW. That would not be surprising. We have all witnessed the concerted effort by SRI management to disguise the facts on this research. SRI would not even tell the Study Committee the titles of its counterinsurgency contracts, let alone their number and cost. You will recall that Charles Anderson, SRI president, would not tell you the total amount of these contracts at your April 22 meeting. When asked, Mr. Anderson said the figure was "undefinable." Immediately, Harry Cleaver, a member of the Study Committee and a guest at your

meeting, said to Mr. Anderson:

"Yes, there is a gray area in the definition of counterinsurgency, but is it not true that without any question one could eliminate, first, all of those contracts explicitly labeled 'counterinsurgency' by the Defense Department, and second, the Regional Security Study Center in Thailand, whose work is totally counterinsurgency?"

Mr. Anderson replied, "Yes."

So at least we know that SRI and the Defense Department are perfectly clear as to the definition of counterinsurgency as it applies to existing contracts. SRI should terminate those contracts, and disband the Regional Security Study Center.

For the Senate to make that recommendation, you should certainly understand the financial impact on SRI. Since Mr. Anderson has not cooperated, we do not know the exact amount involved. But we do have two useful facts(vintage 1968): the Regional Security Study Center had about 38 staff members, and the total SRI military research "directly related" to Southeast Asia totaled \$6.25 million. These figures compare to total SRI employment of 3,048 and total annual project revenue of \$64.2 million. It appears that SRI's counterinsurgency is big, but SRI as a whole is big enough to withstand the loss.

We have focused on CBW and counterinsurgency as two kinds of research that can be dealt with at your April 29 meeting. By discussing these two categories alone, we do not mean to compromise the other goals of the April 3rd Movement. We are committed to ending all secret and war-related research at SRI and Stanford. Since secret war research constitutes about half of SRI's total income, it will obviously be more difficult to end than CBW or counterinsurgency alone. But we hope that you will waste no time in tackling the problem, working in cooperation with SRI's own staff as soon as it develops an independent voice from SRI management.

One particular danger in SRI's secret work is the likelihood of SRI taking on the secret contracts that the University plans to terminate. This would be a mockery of your decision April 24 to end secret research at Stanford. SRI should be strongly discouraged from taking on any more secret work, particularly the contracts which you recently decided were unacceptable at the University.

SUMMARY

At your meeting on Tuesday, April 29, we urge you to:

- 1) Recommend that the Board of Trustees and SRI staff immediately cease research in chemical, biological, and radiological warfare.
- 2) Recommend that the Board of Trustees and SRI staff immediately disband the Regional Security Study Center, terminate all counterinsurgency contracts, and help the personnel involved to shift to peaceful research.
- 3) Recommend that the elimination of secret research be adopted as a policy objective at SRI, and that no secret work be transferred from the University proper to SRI.

Yours in peace,

/enclosure

The April 3rd Movement