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STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND THE ROTC DEPARTMENTS

A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ad Hoc Senate Committee on ROTC — *formed 9/26/68*

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February 7, 1969 ✓

PREAMBLE

The Ad Hoc Senate Committee on ROTC was appointed by a letter of October 17, 1968, from the chairman of the Senate Committee on Committees. The appointment followed the Senate action of September 26, 1968, expressed in the following resolution:

It is the sense of the Senate that the ROTC program should be altered but that proper relations between the ROTC departments and Stanford may be established by review and reform of the present relations. Therefore, the matter of such relations should be recommitted to an ad hoc committee which shall report recommendations no later than January 15, 1969¹; and the matter of this committee's charge shall be further discussed at an early meeting of the Senate.

ROTC has a history of some 50 years at Stanford. An Army program was established in 1919; Air Force and Navy programs were established in 1946. In the academic year 1958-59, the three departments had a total enrollment of 732 students and commissioned 186 officers. In 1963-64, the corresponding numbers were 586 and 86; in 1967-68, they were 383 and 98. In 1967-68, there were 125 students on full tuition scholarships. Currently, the ROTC programs operate under the federal statute known as the "Reserve Officers' Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964." Stanford and each military department have negotiated a contract stipulating the terms and conditions under which the particular ROTC program shall operate at Stanford.

In its study of the details of the ROTC programs and the relationship between the ROTC departments and the University, the Committee held 12 meetings from October 28, 1968, to February 3, 1969. At these meetings of the whole Committee, as well as at many subcommittee meetings, scores of documents were examined, covering such matters as relevant legislation, contractual agreements between military departments and the University and between military departments and students, and procedures for appointment of teaching personnel to ROTC departments.

The Committee also invited several members of the Stanford community to present their views on ROTC. Among those giving testimony were Colonel Stanley M. Ramey, Department of Military Science, Major Leon C. Heinle, Department of Aerospace Studies, Prof. Philip Rhinelander, Philosophy, Prof. William Clebsch, Humanities, Mr. Laurens Wise, Military Programs Coordinator at Stanford, Mr. Allan Strain, Draft Counselor in the Office of Special Services at Stanford, and Prof.

Barton Bernstein, History. In addition, on January 16, an all-campus open hearing on ROTC was held in the Meyer Library.

Because it was common knowledge that several universities were also in the process of reviewing the ROTC programs, one of the Committee members contacted a number of institutions and asked for information on their current position. The information received is summarized in an appendix to this report.

As the study and discussion of various issues progressed, the Committee found that three basic positions could be defined: (1) the University should dissociate itself completely from the ROTC programs; (2) the University should remove military education and training as formal, on-campus programs; (3) the University should preserve the present relationship in its essential form but proceed to implement several changes designed to make the ROTC programs more closely conform to academic practice at Stanford.

No member of the Committee supported the first of these positions. The members were clearly divided, however, on a choice between the second and third. Although in discussions of several individual issues, there were often considerable agreement on the need for change and the nature of the change, the members found their overall positions to be so substantively different that a fair presentation could only be made in separate reports. Accordingly, the Committee report to the Senate is in two parts, a majority and a minority report.

The majority finds that the ROTC departments are, by their nature, incompatible with the University's primary commitment to the unrestricted creation and dissemination of knowledge and recommends that, with due regard to existing legal and moral commitments, the University discontinue the presentation of ROTC department courses as a part of its formal on-campus program, either with or without degree credit; that the role of military personnel on campus be limited to administrative, counseling and recruitment functions; that all on-campus military activities be conducted in accordance with rules governing voluntary activities. The minority report finds that the ROTC programs, in substantially their current form, are in the best interests of the students, the University and the nation and recommends that they remain a part of the academic program of the University but that a number of changes in their administration and presentation be implemented to bring them in closer conformity with standard academic practice.

¹The Committee requested and received a one-month extension of its report deadline.

FINAL REPORT OF THE MAJORITY AD HOC SENATE COMMITTEE ON ROTC

OUTLINE

- I. Definition
- II. Preliminary considerations
- III. General and specific objections to the present Stanford-ROTC arrangements
- IV. Objections to ROTC as an organized, non-credit on-campus program
- V. Recommendations

I. Definition

In seeking to define the proper relation of the ROTC programs to Stanford University, the majority became aware of the necessity of defining its concept of the university. We realize that such definitions have been subject to historical change, and that no single definition has gained universal agreement. The working definition used in this report is that the university is a community whose members, including both faculty and students, have a primary commitment to the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in an environment of free intellectual activity. Service to concerns and interests beyond the university, we believe, is entirely proper, but the university should participate institutionally in such service only insofar as it is consistent with this definition. External sanctions and definitions of the university's roles, obligations, duties, etc., are valid only if, and only so long as, they coincide with the values and premises generated within Stanford, by the Stanford community.

II. Preliminary Considerations

We examined ROTC as a program within the institution of Stanford University, and the basis for our objections is institutional. It is important to draw the distinction between the larger objectives which ROTC serves and the vehicle (ROTC) which is the means to that end. ROTC is an important mechanism for procuring junior officers to staff the armed forces of the United States. The military requires a constant supply of well-educated officers and ROTC serves that need with programs of recruitment and training on many of the nation's college and university campuses.

We believe, however, that there are important differences between educated men and educated officers. Stanford best serves its own purpose and the interests of the nation when it strives to educate men in the way it is best prepared to do, and when it openly acknowledges that it cannot provide all men with all the education they seek. In turn, some of the men whom Stanford educates will choose to become military officers. It does not follow, however, that Stanford must provide these men with the education specifically required by military officers. The armed forces acknowledge this fact by

requiring that military training supplement general education. The military does not recruit officers; rather, educated men interested in becoming officers are recruited so that the armed forces may develop them into educated officers.

The institutional foundation for our objections leads us to exclude political criteria from our report. We did not attempt to pass judgement on the objectives of the Department of Defense or their relation to the social interests of the nation. Nor did we measure the degree to which ROTC serves either of these two purposes. To exclude these considerations from our recommendations merely recognizes the fact that such an undertaking would have been fruitless. From our institutional perspective, such political or normative evaluations would have provided neither necessary nor sufficient justification for the inclusion, exclusion, or alteration of ROTC at Stanford University.

The Majority also consciously sought to exclude personal feeling about the war in Vietnam from its deliberations. Though testimony was heard which suggested an inconsistency between opposition to the present war and continuation of ROTC at Stanford, the Majority was unconvinced by the argument, and still believes that no specific institutional response must necessarily follow from the opinion or beliefs of individuals within that institution. Undoubtedly, contemporary sensitivity to the Vietnam War, in part, gave impetus to the concern which led to this committee's assignment. What is lamentable about this fact is the apparent need for crisis before a university is moved to examine itself. (See page 4 of the SES Report, No. 1.) It is our conviction that these recommendations will serve well this institution and society in times of peace as well as war.

Lastly, it has been suggested that the institutional basis of our objections blinds us to the wishes and preferences of individual students. The argument is made that the Committee has no right, through its recommendations, to limit a student's freedom to choose a particular course of study or career objective. The Majority has no desire to deprive the student of the choice to become an officer in the military. Rather, we seek to change the procedures through which a student must pass in order to become an officer, *only insofar as they relate to Stanford*. Since this University can never offer all possible alternatives, to be realized in all possible ways, the question of total freedom of choice is not pertinent. (Stanford, for example, does not offer programs in agriculture, hotel management, etc.) Beyond our recommendations, which would still allow Stanford students to be recruited as junior officers, the Majority wishes to call attention to such programs as Officer Candidate School and the military academies as at least two other avenues for students who desire to become officers.

III. General and Specific Objections to Present Stanford-ROTC Relations

In considering the place of ROTC—or indeed any

program—at Stanford, the first standard to be applied is whether or not that program is compatible with the concept of the University as defined, autonomously, by Stanford itself. All members of the Committee and all witnesses appearing before it, acknowledge that present ROTC practices depart from general University practice in many areas. Some have suggested to the Committee that the very constellation of problems is a kind of *ipso facto* case against ROTC. While not accepting this view at face value, we have found that anomalies and exceptions to prevailing practice exist academically, structurally, contractually and in matters of personnel.

A great number of changes have been suggested to bring the ROTC programs into closer conformity with accepted practice, many of them on the initiative of the armed forces and the ROTC programs themselves. These have been most extensive in, but not limited to, the academic area: curriculum planning, course credit, content, and substitution. It seems clear that the implementation of these changes would represent definite improvement, perhaps eliminating some problems and reducing others.

But even if all these alterations are in fact made, there will still remain a residuum of anomaly. In the Majority's view, the crucial question before the Stanford community is whether or not this residuum is compatible with Stanford University—or at least compatible enough to be acceptable. The conclusion of the Majority, after weighing the evidence, is that *as a formal, on-campus program, sponsored, sanctioned, and partially supported by Stanford University, the ROTC program is not compatible with the University.* Moreover, this incompatibility is inherent in the very nature of the ROTC programs, and therefore cannot be removed by various changes which are from time to time proposed.

Before going further, the Majority wishes to say that it recognizes the existence of anomaly and exception elsewhere in the University. But to justify the one by the other is clearly fallacious. If it seems to be singling out ROTC, this is only because our charge as a committee limits us to these programs.

The Majority believes that there are both general and specific objections which will continue to exist as long as ROTC is a program integral to the institutional structure of the University.

A. Conflict of Interest. The ROTC faculty, being detailed to Stanford on a limited tour of duty, remain professional military officers who legally and ethically owe primary loyalty to the branch of the service they represent, to the armed forces, and to the U.S. government. This means that, however high their integrity and quality of mind, they cannot at the same time have a primary commitment either to Stanford University or to the academic enterprise. This dual identity should be recognized as a conflict of interest. The government itself recognizes very clearly the potential peril of conflict-of-interest situations, and rightly expects public servants scrupulously to avoid them. It should be noted that neither the government's position nor ours rests upon the fact or even the presumption of improper behavior.

Because this consideration applies to all military members of the ROTC, it therefore applies by extension to the ROTC programs themselves. These programs, as corporate entities—presently H&S departments—are themselves in a potential conflict-of-interest situation with respect to the University.

We recognize that other instances of conflict of interest are by no means rare in the university; these too are unfortunate. But they are individual rather than collective, and they are characterized, in nearly all cases, by a primary commitment to the University (note that the University limits outside activities to an average of one day per week).

B. Training for a specific employer, by that employer. The ROTC programs represent the corporate, institutional presence on campus of an external organization, which engages in specific training of candidates for temporary or permanent employ by that organization. The issue raised here is not simply that of professional or pre-professional training,¹ but of such training carried on by the armed forces, in the interests of the armed forces. The Majority believes that such training should not be a part of the academic structure of the University.

C. Contractual Arrangements. The objectionable features of the present contracts can be considered under two headings: contractual arrangements between the armed forces and Stanford University, and between the armed forces and individual students. While some of these arrangements may be subject to change, others would not. Some are specified by the Vitalization Act of 1964 and could not be changed except through action by Congress.

C.1. Institutional Contracts. The contracts between Stanford and the various military services provide for government commitment of an academic and administrative staff, an instructional program, government equipment, staff salaries, and student financial assistance. In return the University agrees to the establishment of military science departments, provision of classrooms, offices and drill areas, appropriate academic credit for military science courses, and a minimum sustaining enrollment and output of officers. In the case of the Army, representation on all faculty committees whose recommendations would directly affect the Department of Military Science is stipulated. These contracts further provide for prior approval and right of dismissal by Stanford of all military officers assigned to the department, assignment of the rank of professor to the senior commissioned officer of each service assigned to the institution and lesser academic rank to other members of the staffs, and the right of the Secretary of the military service involved to relieve from duty any officer or enlisted man assigned to work at Stanford. These terms represent a partial abdication of University control over the governance of its own affairs.

It should be recognized that these arrangements result in a Stanford subsidy to the ROTC programs. Stanford is obliged to provide facilities, services, and financial support to the ROTC programs on a cost-free basis. For example, the Air Force contract stipulates that Stanford provide:

- (1) "the necessary classrooms, administrative offices, storage spaces, government vehicle parking areas, staff parking areas and other required facilities in the same manner and at the same level as is provided to other Departments of the Institution.
- (2) "adequate secretarial, janitorial, and telephone services . . . on the same basis as is provided to other Departments within the Institution."

¹It should be noted that only a very small number of cadets make or intend to make the military profession their career. For most students, therefore, ROTC training is not pre-professional.

An increase in course substitution (see below D.2.), while desirable in some ways, will increase the subsidy by relieving the ROTC programs of that part of their instructional requirements. In the Majority's view, such subsidies of the armed forces are inappropriate.

C.2. Contractual Agreements between Stanford ROTC Students and the Army, Navy and Air Force. In this section the committee states its objections to certain terms contained in the existing contracts between Stanford ROTC students and the three military services. It is to be understood that the Committee does not object to a student entering into a legal and private contractual agreement as long as the terms of said agreement are neither contrary to the academic goals and standards of the university nor encroachments upon the university's integrity as an institution of higher learning.

The Committee heard substantial testimony to the effect that there exists a considerable difference between *de facto* practice and *de jure* obligations. Specifically, it has been the practice of the three services to terminate a four-year financial-assistance contract in the first two years without penalty or prejudice. This has a mitigating effect but leaves the legal provisions of the contracts technically intact.

C.2.a. Academic Prescriptions. All three services require certain specified courses of study. By contract, the student must follow this prescribed course of study.¹ In addition, the Navy financial assistance program specifically excludes certain courses of study,² and the Air Force contracts for certain courses of study.³ These restrictions and requirements conflict with the Majority view that Stanford undergraduates should not be bound by law to take and complete a course of study prescribed by some agent or agency external to the University, when that agency also determines (directly or indirectly) the mode and content of instruction of all or part of the prescribed course.

All three services require that ROTC cadets meet certain academic standards. The Majority believes that Stanford undergraduates should not be bound by law to maintain academic standards prescribed by an external agency, especially when that agency also participates in determining whether or not such standards have been met.

C.2.b. Personal Conduct. All three services require that the cadet maintain certain unspecified standards of personal and moral conduct. The Majority feels that such restrictions can seriously limit the student's free participation in all facets of intellectual inquiry and legal political activity. Furthermore, the Navy financial assistance contract stipulates that the candidate "remain unmarried until commissioned."⁴ These standards too are established by an agency external to the University, and judgments concerning them

are made by the same agency. While the Majority recognizes the special requirements of the armed forces and could not object to similar conditions in contracts between individual students and the military services *when not a part of a university program or activity*, it can and does object to such conditions when they are a part of a University-subsidized and sanctioned activity.

C.2.c. Punitive Clauses. All three services include in their financial assistance contracts clauses that bind the student to a period of enlisted service for "willfully evading" stipulated terms.⁵ Despite the fact that these clauses have rarely been invoked at Stanford, the Majority deems them clearly punitive in intent, and feels that they unduly infringe the student's freedom within the University community.

C.2.d. Contracts for Service. To our knowledge, the ROTC contracts are the only University-sponsored and sanctioned contracts on the undergraduate level that bind a student to service. There are various loan programs such as the NDEA which allow teaching service to act in lieu of repayments. Still, these loan programs do not require service, since the loans can be repaid with appropriate interest over a period of years. The ROTC financial assistance grants have no such provision.

The Majority wishes to point out that these contractual restrictions and/or obligations operate as a whole. The punitive clauses operate in relation to academic standards requirements, course of study requirements, conduct requirements, and service requirements. The service obligation is intimately related to the course of study requirements. It is this interlocking of contractual requirements, restrictions, and obligations that makes the whole much more objectionable than each of its parts might suggest. The University's rights and obligations to establish, maintain, and judge its own standards of academics, course of study, and student conduct is fundamental to our conception of the university as defined above.

D. Academic Objections

In considering the academic aspects of the problem, the Committee heard public testimony that ROTC courses were of very high calibre. We do not wish to contest this, though members of the Committee have also heard informally and confidentially that the contrary is also sometimes the case. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the Majority's objections do not rest on these grounds, but on the inherent goals of these courses.

D.1. Course Goals. Although in recent years the Department of Defense instruction plans for the ROTC programs have allowed Professors of Military Science increasing flexibility in the choice of text materials and in course substitution, the ultimate goals of these programs are still fixed by the Department of Defense. These goals are not compatible with the University's "primary commitment to the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in an environment of free intellectual activity." The primary goal of the ROTC programs is to educate, train, and evaluate junior officers for the U.S. Armed Forces. The *Plan for NROTC Instructional Program* (Navpers 93941, May 1968) defines as "major goals":

⁵The period varies from two years (Navy) to four years (Army).

¹In DA Form 597-Modified, Part 1, Sec. A, the student agrees to "continue in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps for the remainder of (his) course at this institution." The Army financial contract, DA Form 597-2-R, Para. 1, Sec. B stipulates that the contracting student shall "complete prescribed Military Science courses, drills, summer camps, and other directed training." Similar stipulations may be found in Navy and Air Force contracts.

²Navpers 1110/24 (6-67), Para. 4 states that the contractor shall not be allowed to take up certain courses of study and lists 33 of these.

³At 1056, Para. 9 specifies three enrollment categories. Each requires a somewhat different course of study, depending on the preliminary assignment of cadets as aviators, navigators, or ground officers of various types. Change in enrollment category is subject to review by the Air Force and can result in discontinuation from the program.

⁴Navpers 1110/24 (6-67), Para. 1, Sec. 2.

(1) To assist in the education of the midshipman in a major field of study of interest to the Navy or Marine Corps leading to a baccalaureate degree.

(2) To provide the midshipman with the fundamental concepts and principles of Naval Science and with the professional Naval knowledge necessary to establish a sound basis for his future growth as a Naval or Marine Corps officer.

(3) To prepare the midshipman for service with the highest sense of honor and integrity as a commissioned officer; to cultivate the essential elements of military leadership; to foster the growth of a strong sense of loyalty and dedication to his Service and to the Nation.

(4) To prepare the midshipman to undertake successfully in later periods of his career, advanced/continuing education in a field of application and interest to the Naval Service.

(5) To inject the values of civilian higher education into the Naval Service by utilizing the expertise of civilian faculty instruction where applicable. (Italics ours)

The Army Program of Instruction states that the objectives of ROTC are "to procure and produce junior officers who by education, training, attitude and inherent qualities are suitable for continued development as officers in the Army." And the Air Force ROTC mission "is to commission career-oriented second lieutenants in response to Air Force requirements" by successfully accomplishing the following four objectives:

(1) Identify, motivate, and select qualified students to complete the Air Force ROTC program.

(2) Provide college-level education that will qualify cadets for commissioning in the U.S. Air Force.

(3) Heighten each cadet's appreciation of, and dedication to, American principles, give him an understanding of how the Air Force serves the national interest, and develop his potential as a leader and manager and his understanding of officer professionalism in the Air Force.

(4) Commission in the U.S. Air Force high quality second lieutenants. (Italics ours)

The goals of these programs are clearly non-academic in nature. Given the goals of these programs as defined above, Military Science instructors are legally and ethically obligated to present their course material from restricted points of view, to evaluate the student's fitness for a military career partly on these grounds, and to report this evaluation to higher authorities.

Since the goals of the ROTC Programs are to educate potential officers, much of the current Military Science course content—weapons systems, small-unit tactics, Army administration, orientation, counter-insurgency, etc.—is of such a narrowly pragmatic, professional nature as to be incompatible with an undergraduate academic credit program. Although the Minority Report's proposed Committee on Military Studies might deny academic credit to some of these "nuts and bolts" courses, others might remain in the credit program. And indeed, one might question whether any course with the goals outlined above merits inclusion in Stanford's academic credit structure. Although knowledge is disseminated in ROTC courses, it is rarely created in an environment of free intellectual activity; and it is disseminated to the end that committed junior officers to enter the U.S. Armed Forces. The Military Science Programs' lack of awareness of what we believe to be the primary commitment of the University is further evidenced in their

equation of the "values of civilian higher education" with the "expertise of civilian faculty where applicable." (NROTC Goals No. 5)

D.2. *Course Substitution.* The substitution of courses in regular academic departments for courses presently taught by the ROTC faculty (particularly U.S. military history and U.S. foreign policy) has been frequently suggested. This has some attractive features, but these should not blind one to the problems it also entails.

D.2.a. Such courses would have to meet the goals set forth by the armed forces. Senior ROTC faculty are being granted wide latitude in determining whether or not goals are being met by a particular course, but it is nevertheless true that the scope, coverage, and content of such courses will be under periodic review by the military establishment.

D.2.b. If such a course is built into the ROTC curriculum and required of all cadets, then the presumption exists that the course will meet the needs of the ROTC in scope, coverage, approach, and frequency of offering. The faculty member will have to take these considerations into account in planning course changes, leave periods, etc. If such a required course fails for any reason to meet ROTC needs, the ROTC must reassume part or all of the instruction in that area, or drop the requirement. But then course substitution is either lost or was unnecessary in the first place.

D.2.c. If such a course is to be optional for ROTC cadets, then some other options must be available. This presumes one of three things: (a) that other equivalent courses are available in the academic departments, (b) that the ROTC faculty provide the equivalent, or (c) that cadets need not receive training in that particular area. The revised ROTC instructional programs seem to rule out the last; normal University practice makes the first unlikely. Thus, here too, the advantages of course substitution may be lost. Finally, it should be noted that it will be difficult to ensure that the course is in fact "optional." If other options are limited, and if cadets are "strongly urged" to enroll in a particular course, is that course truly optional?

D.2.d. Course substitution will increase both the direct and indirect subsidy of Stanford to the ROTC by assuming part of the training of ROTC cadets (see below). It will add to the work of the academic department and the individual faculty member by the number of students who would not otherwise have enrolled in his course (this could, for example, require additional expenditures for T.A.'s, readers, etc.). The call upon the resources of the ROTC programs will be correspondingly lightened.

D.3. *Departmental Status.* An academic department shares much the same definition as the institution of which it is a part, with particular reference to a specific area and/or discipline. When a student has demonstrated a certain competence in this area or discipline, he is recommended for a degree, either at the undergraduate or graduate level. The Departments of Military Science do not do this at either level; rather, they offer commissions in the Armed Forces to the men who successfully complete their programs. Unlike other departments or schools in the University, the ROTC Departments are educating young men not to academic ends but to work for a specific employer in a specific area.

The Minority recommends combining the three ROTC

Departments into a single Department of Military Studies, no longer to be lodged in the School of Humanities and Sciences but to be responsible to the Provost via a Committee on Military Studies. The Majority believes this is a recognition of the anomalous nature of such a department, which has neither undergraduate nor graduate majors and serves non-academic ends.

D.4. Faculty Search and Appointment. The Military Science Departments' faculty is appointed in an irregular way. The appointment procedure for Military Science personnel bypasses both department-initiated search and evaluation, and the normal administrative ratification process. Whenever a position becomes vacant, the appropriate branch of the Armed Services presents nominations for the position to the Provost's Office. The administration may veto any military nominations. (It has done so at least three times.) The nominee's military record and college transcripts are examined and, whenever possible, a personal interview is held. Though ROTC faculty are presently members of the Academic Council, they are not subject to the usual University policy on tenure, for the Defense Department agrees to recall them immediately at the request of the administration. (Stanford has exercised this option once in recent years.) Furthermore, the Department of Defense reserves the right to transfer from Stanford any assigned military personnel. Thus, under present arrangements, an external organization may unilaterally remove a member of the Stanford faculty.

This irregular appointment and retention procedure violates the principle that the primary responsibility for faculty appointment and status rests with the Stanford faculty and administration. Secondly, it creates a special class of faculty members having some characteristics not shared by the regular faculty and lacking others. Thirdly, since Stanford cannot initiate the search nor fully supervise the screening process, the University loses some degree of control over the quality of the ROTC faculty. These irregular features would continue, even under revised procedures.

IV. Objections to ROTC as An Organized, Non-Credit, On-Campus Program

The previous section reviews our objections, both general and specific, to ROTC as an academic program at Stanford. Having come to this point, the Majority gave serious consideration to retention of ROTC on campus as an organized, non-credit program of education and training. We believe such an arrangement may be an improvement over both the present situation and the recommendations of the Minority. But it is the conviction of the Majority that the logic of the general objections must apply generally to the relations between ROTC and Stanford. To recommend termination of academic credit and retention of non-credit ROTC programs is to accept the argument with respect to the former but fail to apply it to the latter. We here recapitulate those considerations with reference to ROTC as an on-campus, non-credit program of training and education.

A. What has been termed "conflict of interest" would continue, since ROTC would remain the corporate representation of the armed forces within the structure of the University, staffed by professional military officers. If ROTC is

retained as a non-credit program, several operational problems will grow directly out of the fact that ROTC will remain in the University but not of the University. Any solution of these problems will constitute recognition of the anomalous nature of the arrangement.

1. Would the ROTC programs, singly or collectively, continue as "Department(s)?" If not, what status should they have? On what grounds would such a decision be made?

2. The same questions apply to the status of ROTC faculty. Shall formal academic rank be accorded, as presently required by law? To whom, at what level, and on what grounds?

3. How shall the University handle search and appointment procedures for persons offering no accredited work, but who present courses required of a certain proportion of the student body?

4. How shall the University oversee the content and mode of instruction in these non-credit but required courses?

B. The primary goal of the ROTC programs would remain, as before, the recruitment and training of junior officers. Thus, specific training for employment by an outside organization, carried on by members of that organization, would continue.

C. Institutional contracts would remain, though perhaps in a modified form. Thus, disproportionate subsidization of the military at Stanford would continue: direct subsidies in the form of facilities, services, etc., indirect subsidies in the form of course substitution, etc.

D. Individual contracts, requiring participation in ROTC training programs on-campus by signatories, would continue. It is here not the existence of such contracts that is objected to; rather it is to the institutional sanction and support given these contracts by Stanford University.

V. Recommendations

Thus far the Majority has emphasized those aspects of the present ROTC which make them objectionable to the point of incompatibility with the University. We believe such analysis, while lengthy and complex, is necessary whenever a significant change is recommended for an on-going academic program. Also required is some projection of the nature and structure of the revised program. That is, having dealt with objections in the relationship between Stanford and the ROTC departments, what is considered to be the proper relationship?

It should be noted, first, that no accurate projection can be made because it is not known what limits the Department of Defense has for its junior officer procurement program. We cannot predict what will be acceptable to the military services beyond existing operational and legal constraints.

Secondly, the Majority believes the issue of proper relations is confused by excessive reliance on the term "ROTC." The Majority has emphasized the distinction between ROTC as a *mechanism* and the *objectives* which ROTC serves. Our arguments have been directed to the *mechanism*, not the *objectives* or purposes. Misinterpretation arises if this distinction is obscured. If the language of the Senate's charge is taken to mean that "ROTC" denotes an organized on-campus program of education and training, then the Majority is compelled to state there can be no "proper relations between the ROTC departments and Stanford." This, in turn, can mistakenly be construed to mean that the Majority believes no proper relations

can be established between the *objectives* served by the existing departments and Stanford.

It is likely that the program which we recommend would not and should not be denoted as "ROTC." This is accurate insofar as the program has been substantially altered and does not conform to present programs of ROTC. But any new denotation should not be interpreted to mean that we have sought to abolish all relations between Stanford and the purposes of the existing ROTC programs or that we have concluded that no proper relations can be established. Rather we believe that for proper relations to exist, a new mechanism must be created—one that differs from the present program, but can still serve the same purposes in such a way as to be compatible with the University.

We envision relations whereby each service of the armed forces would assign personnel to manage an administrative apparatus, with space provided possibly in the Dean of Students' Office of Special Services, that would concern itself with recruitment of students into the program, process the revised student contracts and scholarships, offer professional counseling and information to individuals as well as to the existing student voluntary groups representative of the three services on campus. Further, this Armed Forces Officers Program would arrange with enrolled students for off-campus training and education. We believe that all education presently offered by the ROTC departments could be transferred to extended summer encampments. The military personnel on campus would be free to offer voluntary undergraduate special courses, as are other members of the Stanford community, following the guidelines established by the Committee on Undergraduate Education.

To these ends, we recommend the following:

1. After a transitional period (see recommendation 5 below), there should be no academic credit received for participation in programs of military training and education.

2. By the end of this period, non-credit, required military training and education should no longer be offered on the Stanford campus. Consistent with these recommendations, a scholarship or contract "program" may remain, comprising normal academic education, supplemented by on-campus voluntary activities and off-campus training.

3. By the end of this period, all remaining military programs or activities should be regulated by the University's general policies on Stanford Voluntary Organizations. No Stanford faculty member or administrator, acting as a spokesman for the University, shall encourage students to participate in military training and education, except in the manner in which participation in *all* voluntary activities is encouraged.

4. Individual contracts between Stanford students and the armed forces should be revised to reflect actual practice. We recommend further that punitive clauses involving enlisted service be removed.

5. These provisions should be in force by the fall term 1973. Beginning with the fall term 1970, no entering freshman shall be granted academic credit for ROTC activities. The three ROTC departments should be replaced by a single Armed Forces Officers Program no later than fall term 1973. This program shall be for the purposes of administration, counseling, and recruiting for off-campus reserve officer training and

education. (N.B. Because present institutional contracts specify one year's notice prior to termination, the phase-out process cannot begin before 1970.)

6. Appropriate University authorities should promptly initiate action leading to revision or termination of the contracts between Stanford and the armed forces (a) in order to enable the phase-out to begin in 1970, and (b) in order to reflect the voluntary, non-credit status of military training at Stanford. We further recommend that a committee be appointed, composed of representatives of faculty, administration, military science department, and students, to assist in effecting the transition.

7. During the transitional period, we recommend that the status of officers presently attached to ROTC units remain unchanged. Until the fall term 1973, newly assigned officers shall carry the rank of "Lecturer," except for the newly assigned senior officers of each branch of the armed forces, who shall carry the rank of "Lecturer with rank of Professor." After the beginning of the 1973-74 academic year, representatives of the armed forces at Stanford shall carry no academic rank. Similarly until this time, the departmental and administrative structure of the ROTC program shall remain as at present.

8. Students already enrolled in ROTC programs, and those enrolling prior to the fall term 1970, shall continue as at present, except that present contracts should be revised in accord with recommendation 4.

/s/ G. B. Cattermole

/s/ T. J. Connolly

/s/ M. U. Edwards, Jr.

/s/ T. L. Grissom

/s/ A. T. Kostelanetz

/s/ L. P. Van Slyke

FINAL REPORT OF THE MINORITY AD HOC SENATE COMMITTEE ON ROTC

FOREWORD

The undersigned members of the Senate *ad hoc* Committee on ROTC submit the following Minority Report with recommendations for the improvement of ROTC at Stanford University. This Minority Report is based upon the following fundamental position.

For the foreseeable future, this nation will require armed forces of considerable size, and will require substantial numbers of well-educated and well-trained officers to lead them. The ROTC programs have been for many years the principal means for providing such officers for the permanent forces or for reserve components. Participation by such installations as Stanford University in the ROTC programs, voluntary on the part of the University and voluntary on the part of its students, is therefore of considerable importance to the nation. Moreover, maintenance of ROTC programs on the campus provides a desirable opportunity for those students who wish to earn a military commission and thus meet their military service obligations as commissioned officers.

In the proceedings of the Senate *ad hoc* Committee on ROTC there has been no evidence presented to show that ROTC programs are inimical to the fundamental interests of Stanford University or its students. On balance, it has been shown that the availability of ROTC programs is beneficial to the University, particularly in its financial aid programs for students. If for these reasons, the University concludes that it should participate in ROTC, the University is obligated to support ROTC in conditions that offer reasonable assurances of vitality and worth to its students, as well as to the military services.

It is the judgment of the minority members of the Committee that ROTC cannot survive as an extra-curricular activity separated from the academic structure of the University. Indeed, we consider that such separation is inconsistent with a decision to continue ROTC at Stanford and would be tantamount to abolition.

On the other hand, the minority members are firmly convinced that a number of important improvements should and can be made in ROTC to meet the legitimate criticisms of its present form and to place ROTC in an appropriate relationship to the academic structure of the University.

The improvements we propose retain military studies of worthy academic quality and proven interest to substantial numbers of Stanford students as academic programs. Removal of these studies from the curriculum would deprive Stanford students of existing opportunities for relevant academic inquiry without accompanying benefit to any other constituency of the University.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The minority members of the Senate *ad hoc* Committee on ROTC recommend:

1. That ROTC continue at Stanford University;
2. That ROTC continue to be part of the academic program of the University with specific provision for a closer integration of ROTC into its academic structure;
3. That ROTC programs be modified with respect to the organization and administration of ROTC, the status of and appointment procedures for its instructional staff, the

curriculum, and the contractual relationships between the military services and the University and between the services and Stanford students.

4. That, to accomplish the above recommendations, the following program for ROTC be instituted at Stanford,

AN IMPROVED ROTC PROGRAM FOR STANFORD

The minority members reject the premise that a substantive case for or against ROTC at Stanford has been established upon purely institutional considerations. Many subjective judgments about the proper educational role of the University are involved in such a premise. Many different opinions exist within the University about what constitutes valid service to external concerns and interests. While it is possible to conceive that under certain circumstances the presence of ROTC could be inimical to Stanford, we do not find that presence, in actuality, to be a threat to the integrity of the University. We do find that over the years institutional relationships for ROTC established by contract and law have become archaic and in need of reform. Therefore we have mainly responded to the charge of the Senate of the Academic Council by proposing reforms that will establish suitable relationships for ROTC. We believe the program which we recommend for ROTC at Stanford will, upon critical evaluation, be found to emend those features which the majority members considered most objectionable in the present program.

Our position rests upon the belief that a point by point comparison of the following program and the objections raised to ROTC by the majority report will affirm that ROTC can be continued at Stanford as a compatible and worthwhile academic endeavor.

Departmental Structure

The Departments of Military Science, Naval Science, and Aerospace Studies shall be combined into a Department of Military Studies. The Chairmanship of this single department shall be rotated among the heads of ROTC Units. A distinction shall be made between the Department of Military Studies and the ROTC Units. The Department of Military Studies shall be a part of the academic structure of the University. The ROTC Units shall be administrative agencies with the function of serving students preparing for a commission in the Armed Forces. The Units shall administer scholarships and contracts, conduct extra-curricular sessions, and advise students on preparation for commissioning. The three units of the Department of Military Studies shall receive University administrative support as the Provost may designate. *Rationale:*

The present arrangement of three separate military science departments results in an excessive administrative overhead and overrepresentation at councils of departmental chairmen not warranted by the size of these departments' instructional staff or the variety of their course offerings. Different budgeting, personnel administration, and reporting in the three military services, however, do require that each ROTC Unit be administratively separate. The ROTC Units will

appropriately operate at Stanford as administrative agencies of the military services, and not as direct sponsors for academic programs.

Organization of Military Studies Programs

A program of Military Science, of Naval Science, and of Aerospace Studies shall be offered in the Stanford curriculum under the aegis of a Military Studies Committee. The Committee shall be appointed by the Senate and be composed of four Professors from the University at large, the senior military officer from each ROTC unit of the Department of Military Studies, and four undergraduate students (two of whom will be enrolled in ROTC and two from the university-at-large).

The Military Studies Committee shall determine credit for courses offered by the Department of Military Studies, shall determine the curriculum for the Military Studies Programs, and shall review the qualifications of military officers recommended for appointment to instructional positions. The Military Studies Committee shall be responsible to the Committee on Undergraduate Education. Proposed military science courses which appropriately fall into the category of Undergraduate Specials shall be submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Education for approval. The Military Studies Programs shall include those courses which are necessary to qualify students for a commission through the ROTC programs, and are available for students who wish to attain a background knowledge of military art and science. The Programs shall include accredited courses offered by the Department of Military Studies, courses offered in other departments of the University, and any approved military science Undergraduate Specials.

Rationale: The determination of programs of military study, review and of appointments of military teachers and adjudication of course credit by a Military Studies Committee will fix responsibility for military studies at the University in a manner more consistent with institutional practices. The military services, under this arrangement, will assume more a role of an accrediting body with respect to curriculum.

Other features of this proposal which seem beneficial are: (1) the provision for continual review and upgrading of military studies programs, (2) the attractiveness to able military officers, providing for appointment of those officers who can make the most substantial academic contributions to the University, (3) the involvement of students and non-military faculty along with military officers in determining the military studies to be undertaken, and (4) a reduction of the sense of isolation of military teachers within the academic community.

The extent of the nation's gross national product that is allocated for defense and the fact that warfare unhappily continues adds relevancy to this field of academic study. A fear that a militaristic view will prevail is unfounded from the evidence this committee has received, and in any event, the military point of view can be leavened by a standing committee which is pluralistic in perspective and reflects the values of the University.

Academic Rank

The senior military officer of each unit of the Department of Military Studies shall have the rank and title of *Professor* of Military Science, Naval Science, and Aerospace Studies, respectively, with the same perquisites which now pertain to those positions.

All other military officers of the instructional staff shall have the rank and title of *Lecturer*, with the privileges and perquisites which now pertain to that position.

In the event that officers who ordinarily would be appointed Lecturer have unusual qualifications, the Military Studies Committee may recommend appointment as Assistant or Associate Professor for the term of their anticipated presence at Stanford.

Rationale: The rank of Professor for the senior military officer appointed to each ROTC unit is considered appropriate to his experience, knowledge and responsibilities, and is stipulated in present law.

This academic rank also attracts to ROTC assignments better senior officers with about twenty-four years of broad military experience and education. Membership in the Academic Council provides a means for desirable involvement by the senior military officer in university affairs.

Since no direct correlation between military education and experience and regular academic credentials exists it seems appropriate to make "Lecturer" the normal appointment for more junior military officers. This rank is consistent with that accorded well-qualified individuals from the professions and the community who teach courses at Stanford. However, when special competence is available or found, a provision for professorial appointment of these officers is warranted.

Appointment Procedures

Those to be considered for appointment to the rank of Professor shall go through the normal review and appointment procedure, or as close to that procedure as is possible. The following procedure is proposed.

- a. The Service concerned will submit a panel of nominations, together with their credentials, to the President of the University. The credentials will include: (1) Personal resume. (2) Educational record, including transcripts of academic work, service school attendance, etc. (3) Evidence of instructional and other faculty-type experience.
- b. The President will submit the nominations to the Military Studies Committee for review and recommendation. It is intended that the Committee for this purpose, would function as a school or department faculty "search committee." Regular Advisory Board recommendation forms will be prepared as completely as possible.
- c. The service concerned shall be prepared to present at least the Committee's preferred candidate for interview by the Committee and the President (or his designated representative).
- d. The Committee will then submit its recommended and preferred candidate to the Provost for review at that level.
- e. The Provost will submit the recommendation to the Advisory Board for consideration. It is assumed that the

Advisory Board will review the cases in the light of the special considerations in the same way that it takes into account other appointments in other professional fields.

- f. Following Advisory Board action, the recommendation will follow the usual course to the Board of Trustees for final action.

For those to be considered for appointment as Lecturers, the procedure shall be the same as for professors, except that the recommendation need not be submitted to the Advisory Board.

In the event that a junior officer is proposed for an assistant or associate professor, the candidate would be processed through the same channel as are professors of military programs.

Rationale: The foregoing proposals provide a procedure closely akin to the normal procedure for faculty appointments. The major difference is of course the initial search mechanism which is conducted through the heads of ROTC units and their respective military services. The minority members considered the title of Visiting Professor but rejected it on the basis that deviations from the norm would be greater with this title than under the procedures outlined. Visiting professors are typically appointed for one year, and have no administrative responsibility. Senior military officer appointments are usually for a period of three years. Senior military officers are responsible for direction of their programs as well as representation to other elements of the University.

Academic Credit

The courses of the Department of Military Studies which are approved by the Military Studies Committee shall be offered for degree credit. Instruction desirable for potential military officers but considered by the Military Studies Committee to be of a narrow training scope shall be conducted as extra-curricular sessions. Assuming that studies in military history and national security affairs will, in the future, be available in other departments, degree credit for courses offered by the Department of Military Studies shall not exceed 18 quarter units or 12 semester units or their equivalent in a four-year curriculum.

Rationale: The military science and studies courses which meet University standards should not be excluded arbitrarily from the curriculum or credit. The evidence before this committee has indicated that most of the courses offered in the military sciences are equivalent in quality to those of other departments. A few, such as Naval Orientation, have been generally acknowledged to be of a narrow training nature and credit will not be sought for these and similar courses. The proposed limitation on total degree credit is not the result of a bargaining process resulting in a compromise limit. Eighteen quarter units or 12 semester units over a four-year period represents our judgment on courses existing and planned for the military studies curricula which are likely to be deemed worthy of academic credit and at the same time meet the needs of the services. Additionally it is believed that this proposed limitation on academic credit for military studies will insure ROTC students the flexibility to undertake their other academic responsibilities without incurring an undue overload. Wherever possible, courses offered by other departments of the University should be substituted for military-taught

courses, thus further reducing the amount of degree credit and student overload.

Student Contracts

Individual contracts between students and the military departments shall be changed to clearly reflect actual practices. Specifically any ROTC student—either those on financial assistance or associated on another contractual basis—must be assured in writing that he may disenroll from ROTC within the first two years of a four-year program without prejudice or obligation.

Rationale: The practice has always been to disenroll any ROTC student without prejudice for future military service and without obligation during his first two years. In no case has a student not receiving financial assistance been denied disenrollment without obligation at any time over four years. The real nature of the agreement between students in ROTC and the services is a compact which the student may break without obligation assuming he is acting in good faith.

Changes in individual contracts will require negotiations with the military services. Such negotiations should be undertaken immediately.

It should be noted that students may enroll or audit military science courses without joining ROTC. Those who are not certain of their interest or choice may use this means of securing increased information on which to base their decision about ROTC.

University Contracts

Contractual agreements between Stanford University and the military services should be altered to reflect the provisions of this proposed program.

Rationale: Contracts are subject to renegotiation on a yearly basis and either party may terminate on a year's notice. If altered relationships are agreed upon, the changes in contracts and agreements must follow immediately.

Retroactive Application

Loss of academic credit by students enrolled in ROTC or change in faculty status of military officers already appointed to the Stanford faculty shall not be incurred as a result of the provisions of this recommendation. All other changes shall be implemented as expeditiously as possible.

Trial Period

The proposed program shall be undertaken for a five-year trial period upon mutual agreement between the military services and Stanford University. At the end of the five-year trial period there shall be a searching review of the success of the proposed program.

Rationale: A five-year trial period was selected to permit evaluation of two complete cycles of the four-year program with particular regard to the evaluation of students completing the program.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing recommendations are based upon a particular view of the University and of the appropriate relations between the military services and this University. We believe Stanford to be, among other things, a pluralistic community serving a number of important and worthwhile functions, including liberal arts and preprofessional undergraduate education as well as graduate training in the arts and sciences and in the professional fields. No one college or university can or should attempt to serve every possible interest in all of these areas, but we hold that ROTC has a long and honorable history as part of the Stanford scene and that it fits within the framework of what Stanford does well.

In our consideration of the place of ROTC at Stanford, we accepted the premise that, given the evident state of the world and this nation's responsibilities in it, there will be for some time to come a substantial need for military forces of considerable size. Such a force will require the very best leadership at all levels that the country can provide. ROTC is a major source of that leadership and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The service academies and other means of officer training, as presently constituted, cannot possibly supply the need of over 30,000 new officers each year. The colleges and universities are reasonable sources of young officers, and ROTC has been for many years the means of the cooperative effort between the military services and universities to provide these officers.

We accept the view that the University has a responsibility to serve the nation and society, for the University benefits directly from its privileged place in that society. No single institution can render every service, and each must, of its own free choice, select those areas in which it can serve effectively. The University cannot be isolated from the pressing problems of our society, nor should it be. One important set of problems facing the country is that of foreign and military policy. This has been so since the establishment of the United States and it can be assumed that it will continue to be so for some time to come. Stanford and many other colleges and universities have, over the years, cooperated with the Federal Government and the military services in the training of young officers; this is one of the relevant major problem areas in which this University has served.

We believe that much of the current anxiety about and opposition to ROTC is rooted in the profound disagreements with the conduct of our policy in Southeast Asia and our involvement in the Vietnam War. We urge, however, that ROTC be judged in the context of the nation's history and in the context of a reasonable estimate of the future. The termination of the present war will not end the need for adequate national security forces and for the need to provide the leadership for them. We believe that the nation's colleges and universities, including Stanford University, should participate in training the leadership for these security forces.

There is no doubt that accommodation of ROTC on a university campus requires arrangements at variance with accepted and standard academic policy and practice. As we have shown, we do not argue for the *status quo* with respect to the way in which ROTC is organized and administered and in the way in which it relates to the academic structure of the

University.

The presence of ROTC as an academic program offends some members of the faculty and of the student body who hold that there should be no pre-professional educational programs, at least at the undergraduate level. Some faculty members and students are concerned with the presence of a program that has certain marked external controls in contrast to the more typical internally-regulated activities. Some conclude that instruction by the military is inevitably antithetical to free intellectual inquiry. But in our investigations and inquiries, we have found that there are several other pre-professional academic programs with an accepted place in the Stanford scene. We have found that there are other activities subject to various forms and degrees of external constraint. We have found no evidence that military instruction inhibits the development of the freely inquiring minds of those enrolled in ROTC; indeed there is no evidence that the present system, with its admitted variations from standard academic practice, is the least harmful to the academic community or to anyone in it.

We do not hold that ROTC is essential to Stanford University nor do we hold that Stanford University is essential to the military services. We do not claim that in the long run ROTC is necessarily the ultimate means of preparing college-educated officers for military service. But for the present, it is the best means available to the country and is likely to be so for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, ROTC provides important advantages to the University and to its students. The presence of ROTC provides our students with the means of earning a commission so that they may meet their military service obligations as officers. The ROTC programs provide approximately \$250,000 per year in student financial aid, bringing to the University a very able student element including a number who otherwise might not be able to come to Stanford. ROTC provides an opportunity to study in a field that is certainly relevant to modern day concerns and which would not otherwise be available to the Stanford students.

Moreover, we have found the military services to be not unmindful of trends in educational thought and have undertaken serious steps to improve the quality and acceptability of ROTC programs on college and university campuses. While each service has varied in its approach to the situation, they all have important elements in common. Each has given its department chairmen considerable flexibility to substitute courses in other departments for military courses, to arrange schedules to suit individual students, and to negotiate with their institutions other aspects of the ROTC programs. The Professor of Naval Science is told, for example, that he "will function as an academic department head in fact as well as name . . . (and) is expected to structure a program of studies for each Naval Science student that will satisfy the University's overall degree requirements."

In considering the manner in which ROTC should be related to the academic structure of the University, we took cognizance of these present and continuing efforts of the military services to make ROTC more compatible with the desires and procedures of the academic community. What the minority members of the Committee have recommended is fully compatible with the trends in the services.

Since we hold that ROTC should continue at Stanford University, we consider it essential that it be integrated as

Closely as possible into the regular academic structure. We believe that it should be an academic program subject to normal University controls and supervision. We consider this to be essential to the survival of ROTC at Stanford.

We do not believe that ROTC could survive with vitality and challenge, be useful to the services and worthy of the University's support, as a non-credit "voluntary activity" program outside the academic structure. We doubt that it would be attractive to any significant number of high-quality students and we doubt that it would be subject to adequate control by the University. As we have said earlier in this paper, we reject this proposal for we consider it tantamount to abolition.

We have proposed a different solution, one designed to bring an improved ROTC program more into line with accepted standards of the University. Separation from the academic structure would, in your judgment, render ROTC ineffective and unmanageable and eventually unacceptable to the military services. We take the position that ROTC can and must be improved in the interests of the nation, of Stanford University and of Stanford students.

/s/ E. H. Brooks

/s/ J. T. Carrato

/s/ R. L. Thomas

APPENDIX

Trends in ROTC--Institutional Relations at Selected Colleges and Universities

I. The East

Columbia (Navy)

A 1966-67 review resulted in a reduction in the amount of academic credit for Naval Science courses from 21 "points" to 9, out of a total of 126 required for the degree. Naval Science work in the sophomore year has been eliminated; "rote work" has been shifted to three summer cruises, where only one cruise was previously required. The Department of the Navy has given the Columbia Professor of Naval Science considerable flexibility to adapt to the changing requirements of Columbia College.

Cornell University (Army, Air Force, Navy)

A faculty-student commission has recently completed a review of the status of ROTC recommending retention subject to important changes in the next three years. Specifically recommended: courses with substantial political or policy content required of ROTC students should be taught in regular academic departments by regular faculty; the services should make greater use of the University's resources with respect to scientific and technical training; no credit be given for courses offered solely by the military departments; all drill, indoctrination and training in military skills should be either

extra-curricular or confined to summer camps or cruises; there should be improvements in appointment procedures of military officers and the title professor should be confined to the senior officer for each service; provision for University supervision of ROTC should be strengthened. In addition to other minor recommendations, the Commission recommended that Cornell join with other Universities and develop a set of new proposals for ROTC and officer procurement to the Department of Defense. The Commission also recommended that if substantial changes in ROTC "are not forthcoming within three years, the University seek other means of meeting the provision of the Morrill Act and its Charter."

The faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences voted in favor of this report.

Dartmouth (Army, Air Force, Navy)

Dartmouth considerations have been very similar to those at Cornell. A Dartmouth committee has recommended reduction of degree credit to two courses, cooperation with other institutions to work out new methods of recruitment of college graduates, limitation of faculty status to the senior officer of each service, improved supervision by the college. All of these are good for only three years; if no action by the services to change or improve, everything should be moved to summer camps or cruises. These recommendations were approved by the Dartmouth Faculty January 30, 1969.

Harvard (Army, Air Force, Navy)

No response has been made to inquiries, but a newspaper report of December 13, 1968 indicated that the SDS broke up a faculty meeting assembled to debate the status of ROTC. More recent newspaper accounts indicate that the Harvard faculty has abolished academic status for ROTC.

Pennsylvania (Army, Navy)

The faculty of the College has recommended that no credit be given for courses taught by military personnel. Other changes are pending.

Princeton (Army, Air Force, Navy)

A faculty committee is at work on the status of ROTC. The following are indications of the trend of thought as reported by the committee's secretary.

Recognizing the need for college trained officers, the committee is searching for a "more appropriate relationship." ROTC courses will not count for credit in the future. Faculty status will be limited to the senior officer or "Lecturer with the rank of Professor." ROTC programs will probably lose departmental status.

Yale (Army, Navy)

On January 30, the faculty of Yale Colleges voted that ROTC should be given "extra-curricular status without academic credit." Commanding officers should be "designated by a title indicating that they do not have the academic authority usually associated with a professorship."

The Dean of Yale College has indicated that President Brewster and the Fellows are likely to accept this recommendation.

II. The Mid-West

Michigan (Army, Air Force, Navy)

There is at present "no great or urgent push" for complete abolition of credit, although if it came to a vote, there probably would be reduction.

Faculty rank is considered "honorary." A committee has been appointed to look into the status of ROTC, and is considering the same questions as are other institutions.

Northwestern (Navy)

A committee has just been appointed to "consider the role of the NROTC in the College."

III. The West

California-Berkeley (Army, Air Force, Navy)

According to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, it is not likely that "in the present climate" the Regents will approve any change in the academic credit and faculty status provisions. There are, underway, reviews of courses and efforts to improve faculty selection to make ROTC "more respectable and acceptable." A substantial interest among faculty and students on the ROTC question seems to have died away, although the Yale action may stir it up again.

Pomona (Army)

The College Policy Review Council has recommended that ROTC be continued, but that no credit be given for military science courses (although a student's transcript should "list" such courses). With respect to faculty status, the Council recommended that the senior military officer be given the status of "any other temporary appointment," but that no professorial rank be given to junior officers.

Southern California (Army, Air Force, Navy)

"We are to date pleased with our association with the ROTC programs and have no plans at present for altering this association." (1/29/69)

Washington (Army, Air Force, Navy)

Under review.