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STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND THE ROTC DEPARTMENTS

A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ad Hoc Senate Committee on ROTC — *formed 9/26/68*

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February 7, 1969 ✓

PREAMBLE

The Ad Hoc Senate Committee on ROTC was appointed by a letter of October 17, 1968, from the chairman of the Senate Committee on Committees. The appointment followed the Senate action of September 26, 1968, expressed in the following resolution:

It is the sense of the Senate that the ROTC program should be altered but that proper relations between the ROTC departments and Stanford may be established by review and reform of the present relations. Therefore, the matter of such relations should be recommitted to an ad hoc committee which shall report recommendations no later than January 15, 1969¹; and the matter of this committee's charge shall be further discussed at an early meeting of the Senate.

ROTC has a history of some 50 years at Stanford. An Army program was established in 1919; Air Force and Navy programs were established in 1946. In the academic year 1958-59, the three departments had a total enrollment of 732 students and commissioned 186 officers. In 1963-64, the corresponding numbers were 586 and 86; in 1967-68, they were 383 and 98. In 1967-68, there were 125 students on full tuition scholarships. Currently, the ROTC programs operate under the federal statute known as the "Reserve Officers' Training Corps Vitalization Act of 1964." Stanford and each military department have negotiated a contract stipulating the terms and conditions under which the particular ROTC program shall operate at Stanford.

In its study of the details of the ROTC programs and the relationship between the ROTC departments and the University, the Committee held 12 meetings from October 28, 1968, to February 3, 1969. At these meetings of the whole Committee, as well as at many subcommittee meetings, scores of documents were examined, covering such matters as relevant legislation, contractual agreements between military departments and the University and between military departments and students, and procedures for appointment of teaching personnel to ROTC departments.

The Committee also invited several members of the Stanford community to present their views on ROTC. Among those giving testimony were Colonel Stanley M. Ramey, Department of Military Science, Major Leon C. Heinle, Department of Aerospace Studies, Prof. Philip Rhinelander, Philosophy, Prof. William Clebsch, Humanities, Mr. Laurens Wise, Military Programs Coordinator at Stanford, Mr. Allan Strain, Draft Counselor in the Office of Special Services at Stanford, and Prof.

Barton Bernstein, History. In addition, on January 16, an all-campus open hearing on ROTC was held in the Meyer Library.

Because it was common knowledge that several universities were also in the process of reviewing the ROTC programs, one of the Committee members contacted a number of institutions and asked for information on their current position. The information received is summarized in an appendix to this report.

As the study and discussion of various issues progressed, the Committee found that three basic positions could be defined: (1) the University should dissociate itself completely from the ROTC programs; (2) the University should remove military education and training as formal, on-campus programs; (3) the University should preserve the present relationship in its essential form but proceed to implement several changes designed to make the ROTC programs more closely conform to academic practice at Stanford.

No member of the Committee supported the first of these positions. The members were clearly divided, however, on a choice between the second and third. Although in discussions of several individual issues, there were often considerable agreement on the need for change and the nature of the change, the members found their overall positions to be so substantively different that a fair presentation could only be made in separate reports. Accordingly, the Committee report to the Senate is in two parts, a majority and a minority report.

The majority finds that the ROTC departments are, by their nature, incompatible with the University's primary commitment to the unrestricted creation and dissemination of knowledge and recommends that, with due regard to existing legal and moral commitments, the University discontinue the presentation of ROTC department courses as a part of its formal on-campus program, either with or without degree credit; that the role of military personnel on campus be limited to administrative, counseling and recruitment functions; that all on-campus military activities be conducted in accordance with rules governing voluntary activities. The minority report finds that the ROTC programs, in substantially their current form, are in the best interests of the students, the University and the nation and recommends that they remain a part of the academic program of the University but that a number of changes in their administration and presentation be implemented to bring them in closer conformity with standard academic practice.

¹The Committee requested and received a one-month extension of its report deadline.

FINAL REPORT OF THE MAJORITY AD HOC SENATE COMMITTEE ON ROTC

OUTLINE

- I. Definition
- II. Preliminary considerations
- III. General and specific objections to the present Stanford-ROTC arrangements
- IV. Objections to ROTC as an organized, non-credit on-campus program
- V. Recommendations

I. Definition

In seeking to define the proper relation of the ROTC programs to Stanford University, the majority became aware of the necessity of defining its concept of the university. We realize that such definitions have been subject to historical change, and that no single definition has gained universal agreement. The working definition used in this report is that the university is a community whose members, including both faculty and students, have a primary commitment to the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in an environment of free intellectual activity. Service to concerns and interests beyond the university, we believe, is entirely proper, but the university should participate institutionally in such service only insofar as it is consistent with this definition. External sanctions and definitions of the university's roles, obligations, duties, etc., are valid only if, and only so long as, they coincide with the values and premises generated within Stanford, by the Stanford community.

II. Preliminary Considerations

We examined ROTC as a program within the institution of Stanford University, and the basis for our objections is institutional. It is important to draw the distinction between the larger objectives which ROTC serves and the vehicle (ROTC) which is the means to that end. ROTC is an important mechanism for procuring junior officers to staff the armed forces of the United States. The military requires a constant supply of well-educated officers and ROTC serves that need with programs of recruitment and training on many of the nation's college and university campuses.

We believe, however, that there are important differences between educated men and educated officers. Stanford best serves its own purpose and the interests of the nation when it strives to educate men in the way it is best prepared to do, and when it openly acknowledges that it cannot provide all men with all the education they seek. In turn, some of the men whom Stanford educates will choose to become military officers. It does not follow, however, that Stanford must provide these men with the education specifically required by military officers. The armed forces acknowledge this fact by

requiring that military training supplement general education. The military does not recruit officers; rather, educated men interested in becoming officers are recruited so that the armed forces may develop them into educated officers.

The institutional foundation for our objections leads us to exclude political criteria from our report. We did not attempt to pass judgement on the objectives of the Department of Defense or their relation to the social interests of the nation. Nor did we measure the degree to which ROTC serves either of these two purposes. To exclude these considerations from our recommendations merely recognizes the fact that such an undertaking would have been fruitless. From our institutional perspective, such political or normative evaluations would have provided neither necessary nor sufficient justification for the inclusion, exclusion, or alteration of ROTC at Stanford University.

The Majority also consciously sought to exclude personal feeling about the war in Vietnam from its deliberations. Though testimony was heard which suggested an inconsistency between opposition to the present war and continuation of ROTC at Stanford, the Majority was unconvinced by the argument, and still believes that no specific institutional response must necessarily follow from the opinion or beliefs of individuals within that institution. Undoubtedly, contemporary sensitivity to the Vietnam War, in part, gave impetus to the concern which led to this committee's assignment. What is lamentable about this fact is the apparent need for crisis before a university is moved to examine itself. (See page 4 of the SES Report, No. 1.) It is our conviction that these recommendations will serve well this institution and society in times of peace as well as war.

Lastly, it has been suggested that the institutional basis of our objections blinds us to the wishes and preferences of individual students. The argument is made that the Committee has no right, through its recommendations, to limit a student's freedom to choose a particular course of study or career objective. The Majority has no desire to deprive the student of the choice to become an officer in the military. Rather, we seek to change the procedures through which a student must pass in order to become an officer, *only insofar as they relate to Stanford*. Since this University can never offer all possible alternatives, to be realized in all possible ways, the question of total freedom of choice is not pertinent. (Stanford, for example, does not offer programs in agriculture, hotel management, etc.) Beyond our recommendations, which would still allow Stanford students to be recruited as junior officers, the Majority wishes to call attention to such programs as Officer Candidate School and the military academies as at least two other avenues for students who desire to become officers.

III. General and Specific Objections to Present Stanford-ROTC Relations

In considering the place of ROTC—or indeed any

program—at Stanford, the first standard to be applied is whether or not that program is compatible with the concept of the University as defined, autonomously, by Stanford itself. All members of the Committee and all witnesses appearing before it, acknowledge that present ROTC practices depart from general University practice in many areas. Some have suggested to the Committee that the very constellation of problems is a kind of *ipso facto* case against ROTC. While not accepting this view at face value, we have found that anomalies and exceptions to prevailing practice exist academically, structurally, contractually and in matters of personnel.

A great number of changes have been suggested to bring the ROTC programs into closer conformity with accepted practice, many of them on the initiative of the armed forces and the ROTC programs themselves. These have been most extensive in, but not limited to, the academic area: curriculum planning, course credit, content, and substitution. It seems clear that the implementation of these changes would represent definite improvement, perhaps eliminating some problems and reducing others.

But even if all these alterations are in fact made, there will still remain a residuum of anomaly. In the Majority's view, the crucial question before the Stanford community is whether or not this residuum is compatible with Stanford University—or at least compatible enough to be acceptable. The conclusion of the Majority, after weighing the evidence, is that *as a formal, on-campus program, sponsored, sanctioned, and partially supported by Stanford University, the ROTC program is not compatible with the University.* Moreover, this incompatibility is inherent in the very nature of the ROTC programs, and therefore cannot be removed by various changes which are from time to time proposed.

Before going further, the Majority wishes to say that it recognizes the existence of anomaly and exception elsewhere in the University. But to justify the one by the other is clearly fallacious. If it seems to be singling out ROTC, this is only because our charge as a committee limits us to these programs.

The Majority believes that there are both general and specific objections which will continue to exist as long as ROTC is a program integral to the institutional structure of the University.

A. Conflict of Interest. The ROTC faculty, being detailed to Stanford on a limited tour of duty, remain professional military officers who legally and ethically owe primary loyalty to the branch of the service they represent, to the armed forces, and to the U.S. government. This means that, however high their integrity and quality of mind, they cannot at the same time have a primary commitment either to Stanford University or to the academic enterprise. This dual identity should be recognized as a conflict of interest. The government itself recognizes very clearly the potential peril of conflict-of-interest situations, and rightly expects public servants scrupulously to avoid them. It should be noted that neither the government's position nor ours rests upon the fact or even the presumption of improper behavior.

Because this consideration applies to all military members of the ROTC, it therefore applies by extension to the ROTC programs themselves. These programs, as corporate entities—presently H&S departments—are themselves in a potential conflict-of-interest situation with respect to the University.

We recognize that other instances of conflict of interest are by no means rare in the university; these too are unfortunate. But they are individual rather than collective, and they are characterized, in nearly all cases, by a primary commitment to the University (note that the University limits outside activities to an average of one day per week).

B. Training for a specific employer, by that employer. The ROTC programs represent the corporate, institutional presence on campus of an external organization, which engages in specific training of candidates for temporary or permanent employ by that organization. The issue raised here is not simply that of professional or pre-professional training,¹ but of such training carried on by the armed forces, in the interests of the armed forces. The Majority believes that such training should not be a part of the academic structure of the University.

C. Contractual Arrangements. The objectionable features of the present contracts can be considered under two headings: contractual arrangements between the armed forces and Stanford University, and between the armed forces and individual students. While some of these arrangements may be subject to change, others would not. Some are specified by the Vitalization Act of 1964 and could not be changed except through action by Congress.

C.1. Institutional Contracts. The contracts between Stanford and the various military services provide for government commitment of an academic and administrative staff, an instructional program, government equipment, staff salaries, and student financial assistance. In return the University agrees to the establishment of military science departments, provision of classrooms, offices and drill areas, appropriate academic credit for military science courses, and a minimum sustaining enrollment and output of officers. In the case of the Army, representation on all faculty committees whose recommendations would directly affect the Department of Military Science is stipulated. These contracts further provide for prior approval and right of dismissal by Stanford of all military officers assigned to the department, assignment of the rank of professor to the senior commissioned officer of each service assigned to the institution and lesser academic rank to other members of the staffs, and the right of the Secretary of the military service involved to relieve from duty any officer or enlisted man assigned to work at Stanford. These terms represent a partial abdication of University control over the governance of its own affairs.

It should be recognized that these arrangements result in a Stanford subsidy to the ROTC programs. Stanford is obliged to provide facilities, services, and financial support to the ROTC programs on a cost-free basis. For example, the Air Force contract stipulates that Stanford provide:

- (1) "the necessary classrooms, administrative offices, storage spaces, government vehicle parking areas, staff parking areas and other required facilities in the same manner and at the same level as is provided to other Departments of the Institution.
- (2) "adequate secretarial, janitorial, and telephone services . . . on the same basis as is provided to other Departments within the Institution."

¹It should be noted that only a very small number of cadets make or intend to make the military profession their career. For most students, therefore, ROTC training is not pre-professional.

An increase in course substitution (see below D.2.), while desirable in some ways, will increase the subsidy by relieving the ROTC programs of that part of their instructional requirements. In the Majority's view, such subsidies of the armed forces are inappropriate.

C.2. Contractual Agreements between Stanford ROTC Students and the Army, Navy and Air Force. In this section the committee states its objections to certain terms contained in the existing contracts between Stanford ROTC students and the three military services. It is to be understood that the Committee does not object to a student entering into a legal and private contractual agreement as long as the terms of said agreement are neither contrary to the academic goals and standards of the university nor encroachments upon the university's integrity as an institution of higher learning.

The Committee heard substantial testimony to the effect that there exists a considerable difference between *de facto* practice and *de jure* obligations. Specifically, it has been the practice of the three services to terminate a four-year financial-assistance contract in the first two years without penalty or prejudice. This has a mitigating effect but leaves the legal provisions of the contracts technically intact.

C.2.a. Academic Prescriptions. All three services require certain specified courses of study. By contract, the student must follow this prescribed course of study.¹ In addition, the Navy financial assistance program specifically excludes certain courses of study,² and the Air Force contracts for certain courses of study.³ These restrictions and requirements conflict with the Majority view that Stanford undergraduates should not be bound by law to take and complete a course of study prescribed by some agent or agency external to the University, when that agency also determines (directly or indirectly) the mode and content of instruction of all or part of the prescribed course.

All three services require that ROTC cadets meet certain academic standards. The Majority believes that Stanford undergraduates should not be bound by law to maintain academic standards prescribed by an external agency, especially when that agency also participates in determining whether or not such standards have been met.

C.2.b. Personal Conduct. All three services require that the cadet maintain certain unspecified standards of personal and moral conduct. The Majority feels that such restrictions can seriously limit the student's free participation in all facets of intellectual inquiry and legal political activity. Furthermore, the Navy financial assistance contract stipulates that the candidate "remain unmarried until commissioned."⁴ These standards too are established by an agency external to the University, and judgments concerning them

are made by the same agency. While the Majority recognizes the special requirements of the armed forces and could not object to similar conditions in contracts between individual students and the military services *when not a part of a university program or activity*, it can and does object to such conditions when they are a part of a University-subsidized and sanctioned activity.

C.2.c. Punitive Clauses. All three services include in their financial assistance contracts clauses that bind the student to a period of enlisted service for "willfully evading" stipulated terms.⁵ Despite the fact that these clauses have rarely been invoked at Stanford, the Majority deems them clearly punitive in intent, and feels that they unduly infringe the student's freedom within the University community.

C.2.d. Contracts for Service. To our knowledge, the ROTC contracts are the only University-sponsored and sanctioned contracts on the undergraduate level that bind a student to service. There are various loan programs such as the NDEA which allow teaching service to act in lieu of repayments. Still, these loan programs do not require service, since the loans can be repaid with appropriate interest over a period of years. The ROTC financial assistance grants have no such provision.

The Majority wishes to point out that these contractual restrictions and/or obligations operate as a whole. The punitive clauses operate in relation to academic standards requirements, course of study requirements, conduct requirements, and service requirements. The service obligation is intimately related to the course of study requirements. It is this interlocking of contractual requirements, restrictions, and obligations that makes the whole much more objectionable than each of its parts might suggest. The University's rights and obligations to establish, maintain, and judge its own standards of academics, course of study, and student conduct is fundamental to our conception of the university as defined above.

D. Academic Objections

In considering the academic aspects of the problem, the Committee heard public testimony that ROTC courses were of very high calibre. We do not wish to contest this, though members of the Committee have also heard informally and confidentially that the contrary is also sometimes the case. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the Majority's objections do not rest on these grounds, but on the inherent goals of these courses.

D.1. Course Goals. Although in recent years the Department of Defense instruction plans for the ROTC programs have allowed Professors of Military Science increasing flexibility in the choice of text materials and in course substitution, the ultimate goals of these programs are still fixed by the Department of Defense. These goals are not compatible with the University's "primary commitment to the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in an environment of free intellectual activity." The primary goal of the ROTC programs is to educate, train, and evaluate junior officers for the U.S. Armed Forces. The *Plan for NROTC Instructional Program* (Navpers 93941, May 1968) defines as "major goals":

⁵The period varies from two years (Navy) to four years (Army).

¹In DA Form 597-Modified, Part 1, Sec. A, the student agrees to "continue in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps for the remainder of (his) course at this institution." The Army financial contract, DA Form 597-2-R, Para. 1, Sec. B stipulates that the contracting student shall "complete prescribed Military Science courses, drills, summer camps, and other directed training." Similar stipulations may be found in Navy and Air Force contracts.

²Navpers 1110/24 (6-67), Para. 4 states that the contractor shall not be allowed to take up certain courses of study and lists 33 of these.

³AF 1056, Para. 9 specifies three enrollment categories. Each requires a somewhat different course of study, depending on the preliminary assignment of cadets as aviators, navigators, or ground officers of various types. Change in enrollment category is subject to review by the Air Force and can result in discontinuation from the program.

⁴Navpers 1110/24 (6-67), Para. 1, Sec. 2.

(1) To assist in the education of the midshipman in a major field of study of interest to the Navy or Marine Corps leading to a baccalaureate degree.

(2) To provide the midshipman with the fundamental concepts and principles of Naval Science and with the professional Naval knowledge necessary to establish a sound basis for his future growth as a Naval or Marine Corps officer.

(3) To prepare the midshipman for service with the highest sense of honor and integrity as a commissioned officer; to cultivate the essential elements of military leadership; to foster the growth of a strong sense of loyalty and dedication to his Service and to the Nation.

(4) To prepare the midshipman to undertake successfully in later periods of his career, advanced/continuing education in a field of application and interest to the Naval Service.

(5) To inject the values of civilian higher education into the Naval Service by utilizing the expertise of civilian faculty instruction where applicable. (Italics ours)

The Army Program of Instruction states that the objectives of ROTC are "to procure and produce junior officers who by education, training, attitude and inherent qualities are suitable for continued development as officers in the Army." And the Air Force ROTC mission "is to commission career-oriented second lieutenants in response to Air Force requirements" by successfully accomplishing the following four objectives:

(1) Identify, motivate, and select qualified students to complete the Air Force ROTC program.

(2) Provide college-level education that will qualify cadets for commissioning in the U.S. Air Force.

(3) Heighten each cadet's appreciation of, and dedication to, American principles, give him an understanding of how the Air Force serves the national interest, and develop his potential as a leader and manager and his understanding of officer professionalism in the Air Force.

(4) Commission in the U.S. Air Force high quality second lieutenants. (Italics ours)

The goals of these programs are clearly non-academic in nature. Given the goals of these programs as defined above, Military Science instructors are legally and ethically obligated to present their course material from restricted points of view, to evaluate the student's fitness for a military career partly on these grounds, and to report this evaluation to higher authorities.

Since the goals of the ROTC Programs are to educate potential officers, much of the current Military Science course content—weapons systems, small-unit tactics, Army administration, orientation, counter-insurgency, etc.—is of such a narrowly pragmatic, professional nature as to be incompatible with an undergraduate academic credit program. Although the Minority Report's proposed Committee on Military Studies might deny academic credit to some of these "nuts and bolts" courses, others might remain in the credit program. And indeed, one might question whether any course with the goals outlined above merits inclusion in Stanford's academic credit structure. Although knowledge is disseminated in ROTC courses, it is rarely created in an environment of free intellectual activity; and it is disseminated to the end that committed junior officers to enter the U.S. Armed Forces. The Military Science Programs' lack of awareness of what we believe to be the primary commitment of the University is further evidenced in their

equation of the "values of civilian higher education" with the "expertise of civilian faculty where applicable." (NROTC Goals No. 5)

D.2. *Course Substitution.* The substitution of courses in regular academic departments for courses presently taught by the ROTC faculty (particularly U.S. military history and U.S. foreign policy) has been frequently suggested. This has some attractive features, but these should not blind one to the problems it also entails.

D.2.a. Such courses would have to meet the goals set forth by the armed forces. Senior ROTC faculty are being granted wide latitude in determining whether or not goals are being met by a particular course, but it is nevertheless true that the scope, coverage, and content of such courses will be under periodic review by the military establishment.

D.2.b. If such a course is built into the ROTC curriculum and required of all cadets, then the presumption exists that the course will meet the needs of the ROTC in scope, coverage, approach, and frequency of offering. The faculty member will have to take these considerations into account in planning course changes, leave periods, etc. If such a required course fails for any reason to meet ROTC needs, the ROTC must reassume part or all of the instruction in that area, or drop the requirement. But then course substitution is either lost or was unnecessary in the first place.

D.2.c. If such a course is to be optional for ROTC cadets, then some other options must be available. This presumes one of three things: (a) that other equivalent courses are available in the academic departments, (b) that the ROTC faculty provide the equivalent, or (c) that cadets need not receive training in that particular area. The revised ROTC instructional programs seem to rule out the last; normal University practice makes the first unlikely. Thus, here too, the advantages of course substitution may be lost. Finally, it should be noted that it will be difficult to ensure that the course is in fact "optional." If other options are limited, and if cadets are "strongly urged" to enroll in a particular course, is that course truly optional?

D.2.d. Course substitution will increase both the direct and indirect subsidy of Stanford to the ROTC by assuming part of the training of ROTC cadets (see below). It will add to the work of the academic department and the individual faculty member by the number of students who would not otherwise have enrolled in his course (this could, for example, require additional expenditures for T.A.'s, readers, etc.). The call upon the resources of the ROTC programs will be correspondingly lightened.

D.3. *Departmental Status.* An academic department shares much the same definition as the institution of which it is a part, with particular reference to a specific area and/or discipline. When a student has demonstrated a certain competence in this area or discipline, he is recommended for a degree, either at the undergraduate or graduate level. The Departments of Military Science do not do this at either level; rather, they offer commissions in the Armed Forces to the men who successfully complete their programs. Unlike other departments or schools in the University, the ROTC Departments are educating young men not to academic ends but to work for a specific employer in a specific area.

The Minority recommends combining the three ROTC

Departments into a single Department of Military Studies, no longer to be lodged in the School of Humanities and Sciences but to be responsible to the Provost via a Committee on Military Studies. The Majority believes this is a recognition of the anomalous nature of such a department, which has neither undergraduate nor graduate majors and serves non-academic ends.

D.4. Faculty Search and Appointment. The Military Science Departments' faculty is appointed in an irregular way. The appointment procedure for Military Science personnel bypasses both department-initiated search and evaluation, and the normal administrative ratification process. Whenever a position becomes vacant, the appropriate branch of the Armed Services presents nominations for the position to the Provost's Office. The administration may veto any military nominations. (It has done so at least three times.) The nominee's military record and college transcripts are examined and, whenever possible, a personal interview is held. Though ROTC faculty are presently members of the Academic Council, they are not subject to the usual University policy on tenure, for the Defense Department agrees to recall them immediately at the request of the administration. (Stanford has exercised this option once in recent years.) Furthermore, the Department of Defense reserves the right to transfer from Stanford any assigned military personnel. Thus, under present arrangements, an external organization may unilaterally remove a member of the Stanford faculty.

This irregular appointment and retention procedure violates the principle that the primary responsibility for faculty appointment and status rests with the Stanford faculty and administration. Secondly, it creates a special class of faculty members having some characteristics not shared by the regular faculty and lacking others. Thirdly, since Stanford cannot initiate the search nor fully supervise the screening process, the University loses some degree of control over the quality of the ROTC faculty. These irregular features would continue, even under revised procedures.

IV. Objections to ROTC as An Organized, Non-Credit, On-Campus Program

The previous section reviews our objections, both general and specific, to ROTC as an academic program at Stanford. Having come to this point, the Majority gave serious consideration to retention of ROTC on campus as an organized, non-credit program of education and training. We believe such an arrangement may be an improvement over both the present situation and the recommendations of the Minority. But it is the conviction of the Majority that the logic of the general objections must apply generally to the relations between ROTC and Stanford. To recommend termination of academic credit and retention of non-credit ROTC programs is to accept the argument with respect to the former but fail to apply it to the latter. We here recapitulate those considerations with reference to ROTC as an on-campus, non-credit program of training and education.

A. What has been termed "conflict of interest" would continue, since ROTC would remain the corporate representation of the armed forces within the structure of the University, staffed by professional military officers. If ROTC is

retained as a non-credit program, several operational problems will grow directly out of the fact that ROTC will remain in the University but not of the University. Any solution of these problems will constitute recognition of the anomalous nature of the arrangement.

1. Would the ROTC programs, singly or collectively, continue as "Department(s)?" If not, what status should they have? On what grounds would such a decision be made?

2. The same questions apply to the status of ROTC faculty. Shall formal academic rank be accorded, as presently required by law? To whom, at what level, and on what grounds?

3. How shall the University handle search and appointment procedures for persons offering no accredited work, but who present courses required of a certain proportion of the student body?

4. How shall the University oversee the content and mode of instruction in these non-credit but required courses?

B. The primary goal of the ROTC programs would remain, as before, the recruitment and training of junior officers. Thus, specific training for employment by an outside organization, carried on by members of that organization, would continue.

C. Institutional contracts would remain, though perhaps in a modified form. Thus, disproportionate subsidization of the military at Stanford would continue: direct subsidies in the form of facilities, services, etc., indirect subsidies in the form of course substitution, etc.

D. Individual contracts, requiring participation in ROTC training programs on-campus by signatories, would continue. It is here not the existence of such contracts that is objected to; rather it is to the institutional sanction and support given these contracts by Stanford University.

V. Recommendations

Thus far the Majority has emphasized those aspects of the present ROTC which make them objectionable to the point of incompatibility with the University. We believe such analysis, while lengthy and complex, is necessary whenever a significant change is recommended for an on-going academic program. Also required is some projection of the nature and structure of the revised program. That is, having dealt with objections in the relationship between Stanford and the ROTC departments, what is considered to be the proper relationship?

It should be noted, first, that no accurate projection can be made because it is not known what limits the Department of Defense has for its junior officer procurement program. We cannot predict what will be acceptable to the military services beyond existing operational and legal constraints.

Secondly, the Majority believes the issue of proper relations is confused by excessive reliance on the term "ROTC." The Majority has emphasized the distinction between ROTC as a *mechanism* and the *objectives* which ROTC serves. Our arguments have been directed to the *mechanism*, not the *objectives* or purposes. Misinterpretation arises if this distinction is obscured. If the language of the Senate's charge is taken to mean that "ROTC" denotes an organized on-campus program of education and training, then the Majority is compelled to state there can be no "proper relations between the ROTC departments and Stanford." This, in turn, can mistakenly be construed to mean that the Majority believes no proper relations

can be established between the *objectives* served by the existing departments and Stanford.

It is likely that the program which we recommend would not and should not be denoted as "ROTC." This is accurate insofar as the program has been substantially altered and does not conform to present programs of ROTC. But any new denotation should not be interpreted to mean that we have sought to abolish all relations between Stanford and the purposes of the existing ROTC programs or that we have concluded that no proper relations can be established. Rather we believe that for proper relations to exist, a new mechanism must be created—one that differs from the present program, but can still serve the same purposes in such a way as to be compatible with the University.

We envision relations whereby each service of the armed forces would assign personnel to manage an administrative apparatus, with space provided possibly in the Dean of Students' Office of Special Services, that would concern itself with recruitment of students into the program, process the revised student contracts and scholarships, offer professional counseling and information to individuals as well as to the existing student voluntary groups representative of the three services on campus. Further, this Armed Forces Officers Program would arrange with enrolled students for off-campus training and education. We believe that all education presently offered by the ROTC departments could be transferred to extended summer encampments. The military personnel on campus would be free to offer voluntary undergraduate special courses, as are other members of the Stanford community, following the guidelines established by the Committee on Undergraduate Education.

To these ends, we recommend the following:

1. After a transitional period (see recommendation 5 below), there should be no academic credit received for participation in programs of military training and education.

2. By the end of this period, non-credit, required military training and education should no longer be offered on the Stanford campus. Consistent with these recommendations, a scholarship or contract "program" may remain, comprising normal academic education, supplemented by on-campus voluntary activities and off-campus training.

3. By the end of this period, all remaining military programs or activities should be regulated by the University's general policies on Stanford Voluntary Organizations. No Stanford faculty member or administrator, acting as a spokesman for the University, shall encourage students to participate in military training and education, except in the manner in which participation in *all* voluntary activities is encouraged.

4. Individual contracts between Stanford students and the armed forces should be revised to reflect actual practice. We recommend further that punitive clauses involving enlisted service be removed.

5. These provisions should be in force by the fall term 1973. Beginning with the fall term 1970, no entering freshman shall be granted academic credit for ROTC activities. The three ROTC departments should be replaced by a single Armed Forces Officers Program no later than fall term 1973. This program shall be for the purposes of administration, counseling, and recruiting for off-campus reserve officer training and

education. (N.B. Because present institutional contracts specify one year's notice prior to termination, the phase-out process cannot begin before 1970.)

6. Appropriate University authorities should promptly initiate action leading to revision or termination of the contracts between Stanford and the armed forces (a) in order to enable the phase-out to begin in 1970, and (b) in order to reflect the voluntary, non-credit status of military training at Stanford. We further recommend that a committee be appointed, composed of representatives of faculty, administration, military science department, and students, to assist in effecting the transition.

7. During the transitional period, we recommend that the status of officers presently attached to ROTC units remain unchanged. Until the fall term 1973, newly assigned officers shall carry the rank of "Lecturer," except for the newly assigned senior officers of each branch of the armed forces, who shall carry the rank of "Lecturer with rank of Professor." After the beginning of the 1973-74 academic year, representatives of the armed forces at Stanford shall carry no academic rank. Similarly until this time, the departmental and administrative structure of the ROTC program shall remain as at present.

8. Students already enrolled in ROTC programs, and those enrolling prior to the fall term 1970, shall continue as at present, except that present contracts should be revised in accord with recommendation 4.

/s/ G. B. Cattermole

/s/ T. J. Connolly

/s/ M. U. Edwards, Jr.

/s/ T. L. Grissom

/s/ A. T. Kostelanetz

/s/ L. P. Van Slyke