

CBW research at SRI has been an ongoing concern since the late 1950's. This research, funded mostly by the US Army Chemical Corps, has primarily involved studies on the dissemination of powders and aerosols. Research has also been done on the microencapsulation of liquids and chemical solids for use in aerosols.

The significance of this research becomes clear when one discovers that five of the seven CW agents currently listed in the Army field manual Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents (1966) are disseminated as aerosols, while the other two are "airborne." And, as Elinor Langer has pointed out in Science, "the idea of disseminating infectious (BW) agents by aerosols seems to be displacing earlier notions about how to transmit disease." The success of the defoliation and massive crop destruction now practiced in Vietnam may well be the result of SRI's research.

The following is a list of DoD-funded contracts performed by SRI from 1966-1968. All of these contracts seem designed to enhance the US military's CBW capability.

1966

Research Studies on the Dissemination of Solid and Liquid Agents
Aerosol Dissemination Processes--A Critical Review
Proposed Standard Assessment Procedures for Evaluating Dissemination Processes
Explosive Dispersion of Volatile Liquids (the use of explosive devices, such as grenades, to disperse the agent over a wide area)
Properties of Explosively dispersed liquids

1967

Research Studies on the Dissemination of Solid and Liquid Agents
Pyrotechnic Dissemination Research Studies (ie. napalm and white phosphorus)
Detonation, Shock, and Chemical Reaction Processes in Explosive Dissemination
Secondary Injection of CW Agents Into a Supersonic Rocket Exhaust
Explosive Dissemination from Spherical Devices (such as grenades and guava bombs)
Dissemination of Aerosol Particles by Forming Clouds

1968

Research Studies on the Dissemination of Solid and Liquid Agents
Pneumatic Dissemination of Dry Powders
Microencapsulation
Explosive Dissemination
Dissemination and Aerosol Behavior of Hydrophobic Powders

SRI presently has \$404,000 worth of chemical warfare contracts. A moratorium has been placed by the Trustees on all future CBW contracts pending the final decision as to SRI's future relation to the University. Clearly, action must be taken to eliminate all CBW research, both at SRI and at Stanford itself.

Defining precisely what constitutes CBW research is not an easy task. Clearly research on the production and dispersal of chemical and biological agents need not be used for military purposes. Aerosols are useful for producing spray deodorants and paints, and research on the dissemination of powders from planes is important, for instance, in the development of effective agricultural insecticides. But the Vietnamese have no difficulty defining the nature of CBW agents, and so it is incumbent upon us to set up some criteria for acceptable research in this area.

In looking at the work done at SRI, we must consider the source of the funds and hence the likely use to which the results of this work will be put. We must oppose any contracts in this area supported by the US Army Chemical Corps or any other branch of the Defense Department. This research, while of possible non-military application, is being supported precisely because it is of military value, and at the present time, this means hunger, suffering, and death, for many Vietnamese.

SO THERE'S NOT MUCH COUNTERINSURGENCY RESEARCH AT SRI, HUH?!

It has been suggested recently by Stanford's right-wing oracle that the counterinsurgency research done at SRI is an insignificant part of the Institute's total work. In 1963 SRI did \$6 246 000 (ten percent of its funding) in counterinsurgency work for the Pentagon in Southeast Asia. Ten percent may not seem like an overwhelming amount but the Vietnamese and Thai peoples against whom these counterinsurgency techniques are being used don't care much for figures.

The following is a list of projects undertaken by SRI between 1966 and 1969 and which can be clearly defined usually by their own titles as counterinsurgency projects. Other ambiguous research which could easily be construed as counterinsurgency has been left off the list. Most of these projects have been undertaken by SRI's Regional Security Studies Center with branches on Hanover St. in the Industrial Park and in Bangkok, Thailand. It should be added that everything about these contracts is classified other than their names. There are two additional levels of classification relating to a number of SRI contracts whose existence cannot even be officially admitted. Here then are the publicly-revealed explicitly-defined counterinsurgency projects done at SRI during the last three years.

1966

Investigation of Counterinsurgency Surveillance processes
Investigation of Olfactory Techniques. Chemical Air Reconnaissance
Descriptive Analysis of the Largest Communist Terrorist Camp
Discovered in Spiti, Thailand
Communications in Low-Intensity Counterinsurgency: a Study
of the Border Patrol Police of Thailand
Selected Documents Describing the Communist Terrorist
Organization in Southern Thailand
Requirements for Counterinsurgency Surveillance in Southern
Thailand: The Integrated Results of the SRI Surveillance
Project April 1964-March 1966
The Communist Terrorist Organization in Southern Thailand
The Malayan Communist Youth League: A Case Study of
Communist Population Control in Southern Thailand
The Varian Rubidium Vapor Magnetometer in Counterinsurgency
Surveillance: a Preliminary Evaluation
Notes on the Malayan Emergency: Strategies and Organization
of the Opposing Forces
Material Used by Communist Terrorists in South Thailand
Seismic Intruder Detection Tests
Tactical Engagements Between Communist Terrorists and Security
Forces
Wireless Seismic Surveillance Systems
Patterns of Communist Terrorist Crop Cultivation

1967

Counterinsurgency Communications Requirements in Thailand
Investigation of Counterinsurgency Surveillance Processes
Preliminary Investigations of the Varian Rubidium Vapor
Magnetometer in Counterinsurgency Surveillance
The Vulnerability of Low-Flying Aircraft to Forward Area
Ground Fires
Summary: Present Status of Instability Studies
Communications Traffic Requirements to Support Counter-
insurgency Operations Against Medium-level Insurgency
in Thailand
Patterns of Communist Terrorist Crop Cultivation
Communist Terrorist Camps in Southern Thailand
Infrared and Photographic Search for Communist Terrorist
Camps in Southern Thailand
A Study of the Emergency Regulations of Malaya 1943-1960
Framework and Analytical Techniques: Communist Terrorist Logistics
System Southern Thailand
The Detection of Buried Artifacts by Means of Spontaneous
Electrical Potential Measurements (to find hidden weapons
caches)
Protracted Struggle: Operational Gaming Exercises on
Guerilla Revolution

1968

Human Factors in Thai Counterinsurgency Communications
Elements of Capability and a Scenario for a Possible
Conflict Situation in Southern Thailand
The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations
in Malaya
Handbook for Infrared/Photographic Surveillance in an
Operational Environment
Operational Testing of Wireless Seismic Ambush Aids
Insurgency in Northeastern Thailand and Smuggling and
Illegal Entry Across the Mekong River Border
Communist Terrorist Training Camp Discovered 21 January 1967
Communist Terrorist Logistics in Southern Thailand
The Logistics System of the Communist Terrorist Organization
in Southern Thailand

In the 1964 Dictionary of the United States Military
Terms for Joint Usage issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
counterinsurgency is officially defined as "those military
paramilitary political economic psychological and civic
actions taken by a government to defeat the subversive insur-
gency." The 37 contracts listed above clearly fall within
the bounds of this definition. It is also likely that many
other SRI contracts including those government and privately-
sponsored international economic development projects which
serve to consolidate the power of pro-American elites could
also be considered as counterinsurgency contracts. In any
event counterinsurgency research clearly has and is being
done at SRI and protests that counterinsurgency work cannot
be eliminated because it cannot be precisely defined serve
only to allow the continuation of the SRI research that has
aided American military political and economic control of
Southeast Asia