


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PRODUCED BY MEMBERS OF THE APRIL 3RD MOVEMENT



STANFORD and SRI: An Introduction

Prior to the escalation in Viet Nam, it was uncommon for people in the Stanford-Palo Alto area to question the university's role in the servicing of the military establishment. Research into the machinery and weapons of war seemed justified during World War II: we were fighting Nazi fascism then. When the "Cold War" was at its zenith, and during the Korean War, few opposed military research, as they operated under the assumption of monolithic communist aggression.

In recent years, however, the US military effort in Southeast Asia has come to encourage cries of opposition. Television, films, and newspapers communicated to Americans at home the atrocities of war: burnt Vietnamese children, thousands of people killed and maimed, entire villages levelled--a nation racked by decades of brutal war and seemingly needless destruction. Indeed, we thought of the war as some kind of aberration, a terrifying and senseless mistake.

But we could not justify our country's interference in Viet Nam on the basis of protection for the free world for democracy when the succession of South Vietnamese governments supported by the US proved to be so clearly undemocratic. The arguments of "monolithic communism" seemed inapplicable in this case of an indigenous nationalist movement.

To voice our opposition, we wrote our Congressmen, joined peace marches; some demonstrated at the Oakland Induction Center, while vigils and sympathy fasts were held. Others turned in draft cards and refused to fight a senseless and brutal war.

For four years the anti-war movement has protested US involvement...the war continues, and our pleading has gone unheeded. Instead, it often seems that the institutions of this country have turned against us: At the Democratic National Convention last year, the presidential platform turned from "Stop the War" to "Law and Order."

COUNTERINSURGENCY and ECONOMICS

When it became clear that the government was not prepared to withdraw from Viet Nam, we began to look for rational explanations for US involvement in the War. In doing so, we examined US foreign policy in other areas: we then discovered the 1954 rightist coup in Guatemala, supported by the United States government. We found the US supporting the Branco dictatorship in Brazil in 1964. We found that the US supported Suharto's military junta in Indonesia, despite the brutality and slaughter under his regime. We saw the US intervene in the Dominican Republic, apparently disregarding the embarrassing experience of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Today, we watch a continuing effort to strangle the development of Cuba on the grounds that it is a Soviet satellite, although Castro turned to Moscow only after it became clear that the blockade would continue, and that the US would refuse assistance in any form.

We then began to envision connections between counterinsurgency operations, right-

ist coups, and US foreign investments and needs for foreign resources. One example was clear: If United Fruit Company has major stockholders and directors in the US State Department, then US support for an overthrow of a Guatemalan government which instituted land reform measures (including the expropriation of land from United Fruit) was an obvious outgrowth. This is in fact what occurred, despite the fact that the government was popularly constituted and land reform was a necessary prerequisite to economic development.

As we came to recognize a pattern and a consistency in US foreign policy, the war in Viet Nam no longer appeared as senseless as we had originally imagined it to have been, and the struggle in Southeast Asia fell into the same pattern: it was not so much communism which the US government feared, but rather any form of economic organization which should endanger American investment. We saw that American industry had three principal needs: first, sources of strategic raw materials which could be obtained at a favorable price; secondly, there was a need for markets for surplus goods; and thirdly, industry needs outlets for surplus investment capital generated domestically. This pamphlet has been developed in part to explain these three needs in a context of the University and SRI, but briefly these needs result in a foreign policy which seems to serve to protect American interests-- often at the expense of the freedom and economic well-being of others.

THE ABM and the US MILITARY ECONOMY

In the course of our investigations, we have been obliged to question our government's credibility in other areas as well: the recent and heated debate over the ABM (Sentinel Anti-Ballistic Missile System) is a case in point. While scientists like H. Cory, UC Berkeley, W. Panofsky, SLAC, J. Wiesner, MIT, have testified against the system on numerous grounds-- it is allegedly mechanically non-functional, and will be obsolete by

the time it is installed, etc.-- President Nixon has nonetheless taken to the bidding of what the late President Eisenhower came to call the military-industrial complex; he has done so, too, even in the face of overwhelmingly pressing domestic needs.

As with the case of Viet Nam, it is difficult to accept the apparent irrationality of this governmental decision. As with Viet Nam, it seems imperative that we seek out reasons underlying the ABM decision, as well as Stanford and SRI's roles in that decision.

Before looking more specifically into the ABM per se, it is important to place it in a certain political and economic context, in which the ABM decision appears somewhat more rational. It has been pointed out in this introduction and elsewhere that the idea of monolithic communism, and the accompanying anti-communist rhetoric, often serve well to camouflage American interests in what is recognized as the Third World. The ABM--indeed the whole arms race-- seem entirely justified in many minds by irrational fears of Russian and Chinese aggression. These irrational fears, when played upon by the government, legitimize the continuing defense of complex foreign involvements in what are clearly crude ideological terms.

As the latest escalation of the arms race, the ABM decision must be set in a domestic economic context. Even a cursory analysis of the US economy indicates a dependence on massive government expenditures, in order to maintain effective and adequate demand and growthrate. Concretely, this means that some 20% of the workforce in 1965 was either directly or indirectly involved

in defense-related employment.

Looking back to World War II, it was only the mobilization of human, productive and natural resources to meet needs of the military that pulled the economy out of ten years of stagnation. Post-war recessions are minimized by a number of factors: a high level of demand for consumer goods and investment outlet after wartime rationing and investment controls; large foreign expenditures in the form of aid to Japan and Europe for reconstruction--again, after World War Two-- a war in Korea, and extensive Cold War military spending.

Since economic health is measured in part by the level of spending, almost with no regard for the goods which are bought, the defense and space complex presents an especially attractive area for investment. Weapons systems generally become obsolete very rapidly, as the ABM system indicates, with the incredible expansion of scientific knowledge and expertise; so the scope of space technology can be continually broadened: "Today Sputnik; tomorrow, the universe..."

THE MID-PENINSULA and DEFENSE

In the area surrounding Stanford, the economic dependence on military spending is even greater. Fully 60% of all manufacturing wage and salary workers in Santa Clara County are employed in the aerospace industry-- 70,000 people. A recent survey indicated that if Santa Clara County were considered as an independent nation, it would rank 44th in the world in GNP, while California would rank fifth. A large contributor to this wealth is, of course, defense spending. In the last two years there has been a 40% increase in aerospace employment, in contrast to a 5% loss for the two previous years...before the escalation in Viet Nam.

Another important characteristic of the Mid-peninsula economy is its emphasis on defense research and development. Over 10% of all of the Defense Departments' (DOD) R and D contracts are performed in the area between San Francisco and San Jose. The now-famous efforts of the Stanford Trustees and scientists to establish a "community of technical scholars" helps explain the area's emphasis on the "brains" end of the defense-industrial complex. A number of local defense-based firms, especially many of the residents of the Stanford Industrial Park, are "spin-offs" from Stanford labs, a phenomenon which has been repeated at Harvard and elsewhere. Stanford science graduate students are another source of highly-skilled labor, and the University's science faculty constitutes a pool of consultants for local industry.

More specifically, the Stanford Research Institute is an important source of research for local electronics and aerospace firms. Founded in 1946 to serve Pacific Coast industry, SRI has grown and moved into defense contracting along with the others. Executives of many local firms sit on the SRI Board, and the Stanford Trustees, many of whom are anchored in local companies which make use of SRI, both own SRI and appoint its directors.

In 1968, \$29.7 million, or 46.7% of SRI's work was out of the DOD. \$6.2 million is seen as directly related to Southeast Asia, and \$404,000 was directly related to Chemical-Biological Warfare (CBW). The extent of SRI's dependence on military contracts makes it imperative, we think, to ask whether the Institute is attempting to attain its stated objective:

"...to serve the public through performance of research to improve the standard of living and the peace and prosperity of mankind."

From the preceding facts and perspective, gathered in the attempt to understand the underpinnings of US foreign policy, SRI, and indeed Stanford, stand at the center of an industrial complex, which, much like the economy of the US in general, is highly dependent upon, and strongly oriented to, heavy military spending. To be sure, this is a regional complex, but one which is part of the larger political economy based largely on military spending.

While we have not, in this introduction, looked thoroughly into the implications and ramifications of many of the assertions set forth, the discussions which follow will seek to do so. But we can now see that the original question--"How do we end the war?"--can be countered with no simplistic answer. Our moral outrage over a brutal and inhumane war remains, but it is imperative for those so outraged to interpret this indignation into a clearer understanding of the larger questions of the role and power of the military, the subtleties of US foreign policy, and the role of the university-- and particularly Stanford and SRI-- in this complex set of relationships and ties.

QUESTIONS

The following are some moral and political questions which must be raised:

*Does the US have the right to interfere in the political and economic development of other countries?

*Should the US oblige other countries to contribute to US prosperity at the expense of the welfare of their people?

*Is an economy helathy if it is so dependent on military spending that world peace might be a threat to stability?

*How can the transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy be best achieved?

*What are the privileges and rights of the researcher when his research affects countries other than his own?

*Does anyone have the right to develop or produce CBW, or its distributional agents, or to produce lethal nerve gas?

*Do people have a moral obligation to oppose destructive acts on the part of other individuals or institutions within the country?

*Is Stanford an "ivory tower;" if not, should it become one?

*Should the university's resources be used to service military needs, either domestically or externally?

*Should the university be a place where the problems of society are examined and where constructive solutions to these problems are sought?


*Should Stanford make its resources available to all, regardless of political persuasion?

*Should 23 people with clear and strong vested interests in the existing order be legally entrusted with the management and policy-making authority in the university?

*Can the Stanford and Mid-peninsula community make reasoned judgements about research at Stanford and SRI, when that research is classified?

*Should there be classified research? If so, what should be classified?





CBW AT STANFORD

Background

After the Second World War, the United States embarked upon an expanded program to develop its strength in chemical and biological warfare. (CBW) CBW is considered to be a step beyond conventional artillery and weaponry; it would be used either as an intermediate stage of escalation toward the use of nuclear arms and/or in conjunction with nuclear warfare.

The U.S. chemical arsenal presently contains seven agents which are standardized for use in army munitions. Included are two lethal nerve gases which work by inhibiting a key enzyme needed to control muscle movements. Death can come in less than one minute. The nerve agents are available for tactical field use in a broad array of cannons, shells, and projectiles. Another chemical agent available for use is HD or distilled mustard, a blistering agent which is more toxic than

the original mustard gas used in World War I. Upon contact with the skin, the gas causes burns which heal slowly and are highly vulnerable to infection. At certain exposures, it can be lethal. Other standardized agents are an incapacitating agent known only as BZ and three riot control gases, CN, CS, and DM, which are seeing heavy use in Vietnam. In addition, the Chemical Warfare Service has developed many different types of smoke and incendiary devices, including napalm and white phosphorus, which are also being used in Vietnam.

Biological warfare (or germ warfare) is defined as the intentional employment of living organisms or their toxic products to cause death, disability, or disease in man, animals, plants, or food supplies. Research in biological warfare possibilities, along with chemical research has been conducted on an expanded basis since the Kennedy administration earmarked an initial increase of thirty per cent in the 1962 CBW budget. Work in biological warfare has been called by one scientist

"disease control in reverse." It consists, in part, for example, of efforts to breed into pathogenic organisms precisely the characteristics--such as resistance to antibiotics--that medical workers would like to see eradicated. A study of the research of the past five years shows that the top germ warfare agents probably include four bacterial diseases (including plague and anthrax), at least three viral diseases, and two rickettsial diseases.

Also coming under the category of CBW is the ongoing program of anti-crop research, which has contributed to the heavy use of defoliants and herbicides in Vietnam. A Japanese study in 1967 claimed that U.S. anti-crop attacks have ruined more than 3.8 million acres of arable land in South Vietnam and resulted in the deaths of nearly one thousand peasants and more than thirteen thousand livestock. While discounting the Japanese report, the Pentagon announced in the same year the purchase of sixty million dollars worth of defoliants and herbicides, enough to blanket 3.6 million acres of cropland, equivalent to about half the food-producing area of South Vietnam. With regard to the success of the anti-crop offensive, it has been noted that as in any form of food blockade, children and the elderly are the most likely to suffer starvation, while the bands of men who form the National Liberation Front are less likely to be affected by food scarcity. Furthermore, there have been reports of at least three "accidental" sprayings of strategic hamlets (camps set up for the inhabitants of South Vietnam), and the ecological imbalances created by the defoliation program are likely to have devastating long-range effects.

Contracts at Stanford and SRI

According to Elinor Langer in Science "the current CBW program is the product of decisions and steps taken during the late 1950's and early 1960's."

Stanford and SRI have been in the forefront of the development of this program. In its 1957 "Limited War" study, SRI researchers remarked that "Numerous military authorities believe that we should never again restrict our freedom of selection of weapons as we did in Korea." During the Korean War, CBW agents were prohibited. The study continued, "It is detrimental to the military situation to positively assure an aggressor that a particular weapon will not be used." And so, Stanford and SRI have become important CBW research centers.

From before November of 1959 until some time after June of 1961, Professor Phillip Leighton and Dr. William Perkins conducted research into "Meteorological Aspects of CBR (Chem-Bio-Radiological Warfare)." The project was divided between Stanford and the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Proving Ground at Dugway, Utah, which is the army's principal station for field-testing chemical and biological munitions. Dugway was recently in the news when a flock of sheep mysteriously laid down and died due to an overdose of nerve gas. According to CBW expert Seymour Hersh, in his book Chemical and Biological Warfare, an SRI designed nozzle on the test plane malfunctioned, releasing a full tank of lethal nerve gas on the Proving Ground. A strong wind began to blow the gas towards Salt Lake City, but a timely rainstorm saved the city from an emergency evacuation.

Dr. Leighton was a professor of chemistry from 1937 to 1962 and is now an emeritus professor. In 1960, Perkins was Associate Director of the Stanford Aerosol Lab, run by the Department of Chemical Engineering, and was also a member of the advisory council for the Army Chemical Corps. In government task reports, he figures sometimes as a Dugway investigator and at other times as a Stanford investigator. Elinor Langer notes that their work was to "improve the knowledge of the effects of meteorological conditions on the behavior of particulates in downwind travel from all source types, for

all climate and vegetation and terrain situations." By June, 1961, their research had progressed to the point where "trials were being conducted in a mountain valley complex...a contract (was to be) let on tropical rain forest canopy penetration."

Further research into gas and aerosol dispersal problems continued until at least two years ago. According to Seymour Hersh, in 1965 the Army signed a two-year contract with S.R.I. for a project which "was directed to the use of a rocket motor for dissemination of chemical agents using the energy from a solid fuel rocket motor exhaust for dispersion...Heat and turbulence of the exhaust serve to break up and distribute the agent over a very wide area." A special report on "Micro-encapsulation Research" was printed at S.R.I. in July, 1967. Under the heading labeled "Representative Encapsulation Applications" was a section dealing with "Powders that reach the ground rapidly after being dropped from an airplane."

The significance of this research becomes clear when one discovers that five of the seven chemical agents described earlier and listed currently in the Army field manual, "Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents" (1966) are disseminated as aerosols, while the other two are "airborne." And as Miss Langer points out, "the idea of disseminating infectious (BW) agents by aerosols seems to be displacing earlier notions about how to transmit disease." The success of the defoliation and massive crop destruction now practiced in Vietnam may well be the result of Stanford's research.

While Stanford and S.R.I. scientists were discovering for the Chemical Corps how to disperse aerosols, other S.R.I. researchers were learning how to make them. In 1959, Wilfred Skinner, senior organic chemist at S.R.I. and Richard Cadle, S.R.I.'s manager of atmospheric chemistry, were involved in the Chemical Corps

program, particularly obtaining "fundamental information on the formation of encapsulated aerosols for possible application to the solution of the problems on the dissemination of chemical agents." That work led, through similar contracts in 1960-61, to a three-year contract in 1963 "for investigations of incapacitating chemical materials" (1.1 million dollars), and in 1964 to a still-continuing contract for the "dissemination of chemical solid and liquid materials." (\$2.5 million) The June, 1967 issue of the S.R.I. Journal reported that "Aerosols (dispersions of small particles or droplets in air) have been encapsulated by a completely different technique developed at S.R.I."

What all this entails is clear from a memorandum drawn up by S.R.I. in 1966; "Every effort is being made to coordinate the program at S.R.I. with the requirements of the Edgewood Arsenal so that information derived from this program can be utilized most effectively by the U.S. Army chemical weapons research and development program."

S.R.I. has also worked with CS tear gas. In use in Vietnam, according to the Army, it is employed to "flush out unmasked enemy troops from concealed or protected positions." This gas has also been used to "flush out" people from shelters dug beneath their homes. For the old, the sick, and in a closed space, the gas can kill.


At present, SRI has \$404,000 in chemical warfare contracts and won't say anything more about them. In addition, it has two CW contracts pending worth \$96,000. This is probably the low point in SRI's chemical and biological warfare work, but there is no telling when the Pentagon will turn to SRI for more assistance in conducting its "war without death program." Seymour Hersh has noted that "Some

of SRI's Board of Directors also serve as trustees of the University; they include men who help direct such defense oriented industries as General Dynamics Co., Northrup Corp., Douglas Aircraft Corp., McDonnell Aircraft Corp., and the Ford, Machinery, and Chemical Corp. Similarly, all of these firms have many ties with the nation's CBW program." More CBW contracts are likely to be coming SRI's way, unless the Stanford community is prepared to act to prevent this.

Controlling CBW

Defining precisely what constitutes CBW research is not an easy task. Clearly, research on the production and dispersal of chemical and biological agents need not be used for military purposes. Aerosols are useful for producing spray deodorants and paints, and research on the dissemination of aerosols from planes is important, for instance, in the development of effective agricultural insecticides. But the Vietnamese have no difficulty defining the nature of CBW agents, and so it is incumbent upon us to set up some criteria for acceptable research in this area.

In looking at the work done at SRI, we must consider the source of the funds and hence the likely use to which the results of this research will be put. Our first demand, then, must be for the declassification of all research concerning the production and dissemination of biological and chemical materials. Only when this step has been taken will the community be able to intelligently decide which projects are acceptable and which are not. If SRI officials refuse to declassify this research, or eliminate it if such declassification conflicts with government requirements, then we are justified in opposing any classified contracts in this area. We are also justified in opposing any such contracts found to be supported by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps or any other branch of the Defense Department. This research, while of possible non-military application, is being supported precisely because it is of military value, and at the present time, this means hunger, suffering and death for many Vietnamese. Researchers do not have the right to produce chemical and biological agents for use against the people of Southeast Asia who are struggling to work out their own destinies free from foreign interference.



STANFORD GIVES THE AXE TO THAILAND...

COUNTERINSURGENCY RESEARCH

In its 1946 charter, SRI stated that its aim is to "apply scientific research in furtherance of social, economic- and industrial development and toward the strengthening of the security of the free world." The phrase "free world" here should be placed in an economic rather than a political context. Historically, the United States has supported

countries with political systems which cannot be defined as free or democratic; Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, South Vietnam, and South Africa are among the military and civilian dictatorships that the US has officially recognized and aided. Despite differences in political systems, the countries of the "free world" share a common characteristic; they operate under highly stra-

tified economic systems which encourage U.S. trade, investment, and often military protection.

One of the greatest threats to the "security of the free world", according to this definition, is a nationalist social revolution which would have to reduce American economic and military influence in order to redistribute wealth and power internally, and achieve significant economic and social development.

Counterinsurgency refers to military operations and social science techniques directed toward suppressing nationalist revolutionary movements. Counterinsurgency also includes "economic development" projects and investment surveys that have a high probability of leading to military counterinsurgency or that exist alongside military operations. And, in keeping with its stated objective, SRI research has contributed to the development of highly sophisticated counterinsurgency weapons and techniques. In 1968, SRI did \$6,246,000 (ten per cent of its funding) in counterinsurgency work for the Pentagon in South East Asia.

Since the early 50's, SRI policy makers have been aware of the economic interests underpinning U.S. foreign policy as well as the direct threat which nationalist revolutionary movements pose to those economic interests. Jesse Hobson, SRI's first president, told the American Institute of Engineers in 1951 that "this nation occupies 6% of the land area of the world, has 7% of the world's population, but it now produces 50% of the world's goods and possesses 67% of the world's wealth. ...Research must be the heart, the foundation, the life blood of our present defense economy if we are to maintain this position." Ed Robinson, Vice President of SRI International, told a gathering of Stanford alumni in 1957, that "the free world must not lose Southeast Asia...as it has already lost China."

That same year, SRI researchers were preparing a study for McDonnell Aircraft entitled "Environmental Condi-

tions in Selected Areas of Potential Limited Warfare." After reviewing "the basic conditions which would affect the conduct of small wars in various peripheral areas of Asia," the study predicted that the U.S. would be inclined to "counter aggression" wherever it occurs, although "for indigenous participants, limited warfare is likely to appear as civil war." Dealing with "minor aggression and limited overt Communist intervention...within or without the framework of the United Nations...may be the most serious strategic problem facing the United States for some time." The study foresaw "the development of instantly ready, mobile task forces, characterized by very great firepower in relation to manpower commitment...off-the-road surface vehicles and radically new aircraft and theater transport systems."

SRI: Vietnam

Moving from the theory to the practice of counterinsurgency, SRI concerned itself with the socio-political development of Dien's South Vietnam in the early 1960's. SRI economist and Stanford education professor Eugene Staley headed a special government mission there in 1961 to bring back suggestions for meeting the Dien regime's "most pressing financial, military, and political needs." After six weeks, spent mainly in Saigon, Staley recommended large increases in military and economic aid, "measures which could restore security within 18 months." (NY Times) Staley is also credited with recommending the "strategic hamlet program"--"an intensified population-control measure to enable (the Dien regime) to tighten its hold on rural Vietnamese by grouping them physically into manageable units." (Douglas Pike of the US Information Agency in Viet Cong)

Working with Staley in 1961 was William Bredo, another SRI economist. Bredo flew to Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 to perform a study for the Agency for International Development (AID) entitled "Development of Cam Ranh Bay: Evaluation and Strategy." Over the last several years, the US has turned

Cam Ranh Bay into one of the major military ports in Asia.

In 1967, Bredo also worked on a plan for land tenure reform which AID has tried to press upon the Saigon regime. In its project proposal to AID, SRI laid great stress on its understanding that the program "is considered most important at this time to...produce political results that will contribute to winning the war." Other universities had previously turned down this contract on the grounds that it was expressly designed to prevent meaningful land reform.

SRI has directly assisted the military effort in Vietnam. In 1963-64, SRI performed two hurry-up ("two months") contracts for the Army Electronic Material Agency "directed toward improvement of tropic military communications." Though SRI won't discuss this work, it is probably continuing now. Also in 1963, the Army awarded SRI a \$583,000 contract to do a study of "airborne position location techniques: mapping, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems." This became a \$2.2 million contract in 1966, and available evidence indicates that it is continuing at present. As recently as six months ago, an SRI employee said that the Institute was performing "cost analysis studies of alternative reconnaissance routes (read: bombing routes) over North Vietnam." Judging from the recent statements of the Nixon-Laird team, it is possible that SRI's work would assist renewed bombing of North Vietnam.

SRI has also been studying "the vulnerability of helicopters to groundfire" at Ford Ord, where it has a weapons development and testing center. At SRI's Naval Warfare Center, researchers are making helicopter armor more resistant to groundfire. An SRI engineer who considered his work to be "defensive" said that this contract was initiated "because of helicopter losses in Vietnam."

Finally, Lloyd Smith, Vice President of SRI's Physical Sciences Division, disclosed that the Institute is presently "designing electronic equipment for in-

trusion detection in Vietnam," i.e., perfecting plans for an electronic "axinot line across the DMZ to retard infiltration from the North.

Almost all of these Vietnam contracts are classified and are extremely difficult to track down. (In fact, SRI President Charles Anderson recently said that SRI has a number of contracts that it cannot admit exist.) Until SRI comes from behind its veil of secrecy with full disclosure, our information on SRI's operations in Vietnam will be sketchy. But it is important to remember that SRI has over \$6 million in Southeast Asia contracts with the Pentagon, a considerable number of which center in Thailand.

SRI: Thailand

In 1962, SRI began working in Thailand for Project Agile, the Pentagon's worldwide counterinsurgency research program. Initially, SRI's Thai projects focused on the development and testing of weapons for Vietnam. But with the increase of guerilla activity in Thailand in 1966, the program began to build counterinsurgency capabilities for the Thai oligarchy which would place the US in a "knowledgeable position" should "large-scale intervention in Thailand be called for."

That intervention has been well underway for several years now. Over 50,000 US servicemen are divided between manning the six B-52 bases, the huge Sattahip naval base, and training Thai counterinsurgency forces. There is no need to dwell on what 50,000 American GI's do to a traditional nation's society, but the American presence can only accelerate the Thai social revolution.

It is important to note that Thailand is a military dictatorship, though SRI's Ed Robinson considers it to be "another Asian bastion of strength for the free world." Despite strong bureaucratic control and the absence of a Western colonial heritage, rapidly growing insurgency movements in the Northeast, the North, and the South, largely due to frustration over neglect and exploi-

tation by the Bangkok-based elite and its foreign business friends. Ethnic and racial prejudice on the part of the urban-based valley Thais has intensified economic underdevelopment and political exclusion. The result is that the guerilla strength is now estimated conservatively at 7,000. For years the ethnic Lao and Vietnamese in the Northeast, where one third of the population lives, and the Thai-Malays and Chinese in the South have resisted Bangkok control. And recently, the Northern tribesmen, who are considered to be "animals" by the lowlanders (according to the State Department official in charge of the Thai desk), have begun to join the guerillas, especially since the central government has moved to cut off their teak and opium trade. The military government has responded to tribal resistance by napalming villages and systematically herding tribesmen into lowlying "detention camps."

Leaving aside the question of the Thai investments of Stanford trustees and SRI directors for the moment, we find that various agencies of the US government have turned to SRI to help "stabilize" the Thai situation. In 1964, William Platt, SRI's Director of Manpower and Educational Research, concluded a study commissioned by AID to "make recommendations as to the appropriate and require machinery in the Thai government of the integration of human resources and educational planning with the planning for overall economic and social development." The growing social upheaval in Thailand demonstrates that US-style development, run by a well-entrenched native oligarchy, has serious problems. The Thai military government, the US, and SRI have therefore been turning to a predominantly military solution.

SRI presently has forty-three permanent staff members working alongside Michigan, Cornell, and RAND teams at the Thai-US Military Research and Development Center in Bangkok. The Institute has its Southeast Asia regional office in the Bangkok Bank Building. In addition to social science studies

of the Thai Patriotic Front, SRI has concentrated since 1966 on "Counter-insurgency communications requirements for Thailand." The institute has worked on a number of contracts such as "Atmospheric radio noise data, Bangkok Thailand"(1967) that has enabled the Defense Department to set up a direct Pentagon-Bangkok radio linkage. A large number of contracts in the area of "support for tropical communications"(1966) enables Thai Army forces, U.S. Special Forces "advisers", and USIA officials to move into the underdeveloped parts of Thailand with guns and films. And, a 1966 contract analysing military communications requirements to repress "medium level insurgency in the Northeast" provides data for future U.S. intervention.

SRI's social science work involves writing ethnographies of "unstable areas" and a 1968 contract entitled "Communist Terrorist Logistics in Southern Thailand." The Bangkok office has also been testing devices which "can literally sniff an enemy's presence by the very odors of his body, food, or clothing." (Time, Oct. 7, 1966)

In 1967-68, SRI's Russell F. Rhyne was testing a magnetometer developed by Varian Associates (a Stanford Industrial Park resident) as "a method of detecting quantities of iron of a size comparable to insurgent weapons." A McNamara line for the Mekong seems to be in the works.

Finally, SRI renewed over \$1,800,000 in Thai contracts this winter, in the face of requests from the Stanford student body and President not to renew its counterinsurgency contracts while a student-faculty committee studies the Institute's operations and ties to the University.